First off, the Iraqi security forces and government absolutely had to be de-Baathified. We would never have gained the trust of enough Shias to fight the insurgents and terrorists if we hadn't made it clear that the Sunni Arabs lost their grip on power. Losing the Shias would have made it impossible to stay in Iraq.
I also believe that the twin jihadi and Sadr revolts in March and April 2004 would have been catastrophic for us if we hadn't de-Baathified the security forces. At the time, half the Iraqi security forces simply dissolved in the face of enemy attacks. I am confident that a number of unts would have defected to the enemy instead, making our efforts to cope with the attacks dicey at best.
But room for Sunni Arabs in the new de-Baathified military needed to be made. Just after major combat operations ended, I argued for a policy that excluded those of the rank of colonel and up unless they could prove loyalty to the government and the inclusion of those of the rank major or below unless evidence of crimes or intense Baathist involvement could be demonstrated. Over the years it was unclear to me how strict the de-Baathification was, seeming to ebb and flow with scattered reports coming to my attention.
And there was always the worry that paying the "former" Baathists would just make it easier for them to fight the government rather than retire and decline to fight.
The Sunni Arabs seem to know they've lost now. So the Iraqi government may now think it is safer to offer deals to the former Baathists:
The al-Maliki statement said any former officer above the rank of major would be given a pension equal to that of officers now retiring. Former officers above major who wanted to rejoin the army were encouraged to check with the military command to learn if they were acceptable in the Iraqi army that is being rebuilt by American forces.
Those who had the rank of major or lower may voluntarily return to the army and will be guaranteed a place.
Lower ranking officiers and enlisted men with scientific or medical training would be given jobs in an appropriate government ministry, the statement said.
Al-Maliki, who is the supreme commander of the armed forces, issued a 24-point reconciliation plan shortly after taking power last year. Though never put into place, it was seen at the time as an attempt to draw disaffected Sunnis into the political fold.
The rank distinction is as I figured it should be. Once you become a colonel you start thinking of your first star and that puts you in a different outlook altogether.
Remember that I might have been wrong about how many former Baathists could safely have beeen brought into the government back in 2003 without either risking the govenrment's security or alienating the Kurds and Shias. A good decision at one point in the war does not mean it would have been a good decision at other points. Today, not only may the Sunni Arabs finally be ready to give up, but the Iraqi government and the Shia majority may feel secure enough to accept former Baathists without worrying that the government could be subverted.
If these officers retire and stay retired, this will go a long way toward ending the bulk of the internal violent opposition to the government and allow all Iraqis to focus on defeating the Syrian and Iranian supported jihadis and Sadrists.
