Sadly, it suffers from the British contempt for the colonial lack of sophistication. I'm not so sure the Brits are doing all that well in keeping the Sadr clowns down in their area; but we should at least agree that the British have a much easier sector. Indeed, our Marines were just a little condescending toward the Army in March 2004 before the reality of the Sunni Triangle became apparent. Soft caps would not have been an option for the British if they patrolled Ramadi instead of Basra.
But what really caught my attention was this passage about our new warfighting doctrine:
According to the new doctrine's authors, at Leavenworth's Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, key changes will stress the strategic importance of civilian populations. The army's basic doctrinal aim is to move from high-intensity offensive to low-intensity security and stability operations—from creating shock and awe to winning hearts and minds. The new doctrine will emphasise that, where possible, the two levels should co-exist—where possible, for example, the army should exercise restraint in its offensive operations.
Restraint in offensive operations? Winning hearts and minds in shock and awe?
Recall that some (and I'm thinking of Victor Davis Hansen here) have wondered whether our precision military is too careful in war. Hansen and others have wondered whether the failure to smash through Sunni areas of Iraq with 4th ID out of Turkey in our clean war of March and April 2003 contributed to the failure of the Sunnis to feel defeated in the major combat operations phase.
So when did we have the debate that resolved this question? I'm not sure where I stand on the question. I favored smashing through the Ramadi Gap in the war to avoid harming the Shias we liberated, but I'm not comfortable saying we should deliberately inflict pain and death on enemy civilians to impress them with their defeat. Yet the idea that we've decided that more kindness could have preempted the Sunni resistance seems rather far-fetched.
The idea that we should be even more restrained to keep from pissing off our enemies after we defeat them risks failing to defeat them in the first place. We are already restrained and precise to an extent unimaginable for the rest of the world's militaries. What are we going to do in the next war? Cuff the enemy and assign them their own personal defense lawyers?
Transitioning cleanly from war to stability operations is a fine concept. But we must not fail to use fast and intense violence to destroy our enemies when the balloon goes up. We should never ever assume victory and look to the post-war phase four stabilization mission as if battlefield victory is our birthright.
During major combat operations, grab the enemy by the balls. Their hearts and minds will follow.
