But since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the threat of the Soviet Union has vanished and we can afford to be more (but not totally) idealistic in how we define friends.
Further, we must face the fact that the stability we strove for in the Middle East in the past was the stability of a holding action while we prepared for the bigger war possible against communist Russia. It was never a desirable state of affairs to maintain. Nor was it really stable. Secretary Rice reminds us of this fact:
After all, who truly believes, after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, that the status quo in the Middle East was stable, beneficial and worth defending? How could it have been prudent to preserve the state of affairs in a region that was incubating and exporting terrorism; where the proliferation of deadly weapons was getting worse, not better; where authoritarian regimes were projecting their failures onto innocent nations and peoples; where Lebanon suffered under the boot heel of Syrian occupation; where a corrupt Palestinian Authority cared more for its own preservation than for its people's aspirations; and where a tyrant such as Saddam Hussein was free to slaughter his citizens, destabilize his neighbors and undermine the hope of peace between Israelis and Palestinians? It is sheer fantasy to assume that the Middle East was just peachy before America disrupted its alleged stability.
Times change and so strategy must change. How is denying changing circumstances being a realist?
President Bush has it right:
As he usually does, Bush asserted that the Iraq of the future, with a functioning democracy and thriving economy, would be a model for other nations in the turbulent Middle East. But he added a specific reference to the inspiration that a free Iraq would provide to reformers in the region's two governments most hostile to the United States — Syria and Iran.
The President has faced reality and adapted our strategy left over from the Cold War. How on Earth can the proponents of the old strategy be called "realists?"
