Are we approaching the last acts of the Winter War of 2022? Russia seems anxious to end the war before Ukraine is better armed. With Trump's frustration with Putin over ending the war evident, Russia must worry America will open up the arms spigot to end the war on another route.
The war goes on. It seems like something is looming along the front. This report on potential war outcomes notably fails to consider a collapse of Russian ground force morale in response to casualties. Which to me seems more likely than a Ukrainian collapse. But unless Ukraine has a reserve to exploit a Russian morale collapse, Russia has more ability to exploit a Ukrainian collapse.
I never believed Trump was a danger to Ukraine. I said he would find other ways to arm Ukraine. He never canceled the arms jammed into the pipeline by the outgoing Biden administration (except for one Pentagon halt--that was quickly overruled--to review assets potentially needed by the American military). And American help with intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting has continued with only one or two blips this year.
I firmly believe Trump's nice treatment of Putin was not from admiration but from the need to build some trust to achieve peace. That objective was a long shot, at best. But trying and failing does justify a change of policy.
One way for America to help Ukraine is having Europeans pay for American weapons. That is being done. Another way is having Ukraine pay. The minerals deal we finalized is one potential avenue. And this deal is another:
The primary focus of the [Ukrainian delegation] visit was to present Ukrainian unmanned aerial systems (UAS) capabilities, discuss procurement terms, and explore options for integrating them into U.S. defense operations.
America could pay with more weapons and ammunition for Ukraine, no?
Meanwhile, Russia seems worried rather than a real invasion danger. I don't see Russia's recent drone pressure (and other covert attacks) on NATO as aggressiveness as much as I see it as desperation. Would Russian leaders confident they could defeat Ukraine really risk victory by widening the war to NATO needlessly? No. They'd suck it up, defeat Ukraine, and only then look at getting back at NATO.
NATO should openly bolster defenses against drones, missiles; and quietly defeat covert Russian attacks inside Europe and increase support to Ukraine. That is the best way to punish Russia rather than shooting down a manned Russian aircraft. Russia would love that and use it to issue extreme threats to widen splits in the West for arming Ukraine.
Meanwhile at the front, this deployment of a relatively (and turn down the lights and squint) elite Russian airborne unit to the Kherson sector is interesting:
The reason for the redeployment of the 98th VDV Division is unclear. The Russian military command may be redeploying the 98th VDV Division to the Kherson direction to allow it to rest and reconstitute away from active frontline ground operations.
Huh.
A sector of the front that is quiet and safe for rest and reconstitution? Sounds so familiar:
The Germans achieved a total surprise attack on the morning of 16 December 1944, due to a combination of Allied overconfidence based on the favorable defensive terrain and faulty intelligence about Wehrmacht intentions, poor aerial reconnaissance due to bad weather, and a preoccupation with Allied offensive plans elsewhere. American forces were using this region primarily as a rest area for the U.S. First Army, and the lines were thinly held by fatigued troops and inexperienced replacement units. The Germans also took advantage of heavily overcast weather conditions that grounded the Allies' superior air forces for an extended period.
And my attention keeps going back to the Kherson front more than two years after Ukraine's failed 2023 summer counteroffensive. The 2023 was simultaneously too late to exploit Russia's culmination and too hastily prepared to succeed against reinforced and dug-in Russian troops. In that post I speculated that the new corps reorganization could be significant for a counteroffensive.
Perhaps last year's Ukrainian August Kursk attack was a proof of concept. And now Ukraine is forming large divisions (called corps) to expand that capability.
I know, I know. Connecting a few dots to create a full picture is highly risky. Especially one I would like to see. But I keep going back to the idea that I cannot imagine that Ukraine and its NATO senior advisors have settled on passively outlasting Russia on the ground as the means of defeating Russia. Oh, a tough defense by Ukraine is as useful as the Red Army's tough defense of its Kursk Salient in 1943 that decimated Germany's offensive capabilities. But ultimately the Soviets had to follow that up with a big attack to drive the actual Nazis back to Berlin.
I admit I am reduced to speculating. But it isn't just that. I'm trying to figure out what I would do were I the God of Strategic Planning for Ukraine.
In unrelated news, Ukraine has completed its ground force reorganization into corps.
UPDATE (Monday): I don't know how I missed this article, but it is close to what I expected regarding Ukraine's new corps:
Compared to their US Army counterparts, the Ukrainian corps are closer to big divisions, with five or so maneuver brigades in each. ...
The 8th Corps has confirmed it will receive an artillery brigade (the 148th). Other corps likely will get artillery brigades as well, although Ukraine may have to form more if every corps is to get one, depending on how many corps end up being created. Additional support elements will likely include anti-aircraft, logistics, drone, electronic warfare, engineer-sapper, communications, and repair-restoration units, among others. ...
Ukraine is short on some corps-level capabilities. For example, unlike earlier Ukrainian corps, the current ones likely will not have army aviation units—at least not anytime soon—as Kyiv lacks enough helicopters.
And MLRS with longer ranges are insufficient to equip each corps. They might be held at higher levels.
Much more at the link.
UPDATE (Friday): Discussing the actions of the Azov Corps counter-attacking around Russia's penetrations in the Dobropillia area.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
NOTE: Image of the 1940 German attack through the Ardennes, from the source indicated on the image.
