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Tuesday, May 07, 2024

Unintended Consequences in Ukraine

Never doubt the potential of seemingly trivial actions. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, taking over Crimea and part of the Donbas, Putin set in motion consequences that would derail his 2022 invasion of Ukraine in the south. 

Over a year ago I noted the stalled Russian drive on Odessa at the beginning of the war:

The Russians made rapid advances out of Crimea despite the choke points and numerous irrigation canals in the Kherson region. How did that happen? A year later Ukraine says it still doesn't know. Although clearly the Ukrainians had too few troops. The story recounts the volunteer militia that rose up to blunt the drive on Odessa at Mykolaiv, which is already known. I was shocked at the speed of Russia's advance in the south. Without that failure, Ukraine would be in a far better position. I suspect Russia turned some of the leadership in the south who expected a quick Russian win.
It was clearly a close-run thing given the reliance on Ukrainian local militia to stop the Russian overland drive on Odessa across the river obstacles after bursting out of Crimea at a rapid clip. While Russia threatened an amphibious operation with the assets it had, Russia never tried to do so.

You'd think an amphibious invasion based out of their new power projection platform of Crimea would have been Conquest 101. Indeed, Russia had observed that its 2008 Georgia invasion would have worked better with French Mistral amphibious warfare ships, as I noted:

Their Black Sea fleet took part in the invasion, and the Russians have noted that they could have carried out the amphibious operation incredibly faster if they had proper amphibious warfare platforms.

When Russia contracted with France to buy the French large-deck Mistral amphibious warfare ships, Russia promised after the brief 2008 war on Georgia not to base the ships in the Black Sea. Russia lied. After taking Crimea in 2014, Russia boldly said it would base the first of two ships initially purchased in Crimea. Russia knew the Black Sea was where a new war would be fought. So of course they'd base a ship there.

But invading Ukraine in 2014 had collateral damage. France eventually cancelled the sale to punish Russia (quoting a story):

In a further sign of the West's growing mistrust and disapproval of Moscow over its conduct in Ukraine, France said it would not go ahead with the planned delivery of the first of two Mistral helicopter carriers to Russia.

The reason Russia had tried to purchase the ships--four was to be the total purchase--is because Russia had lost the ability to build large warships after the collapse of the Soviet Union. So Russia did not have an alternative to the French ships.

Eventually, the two ships already under construction went to Egypt

Would Russia have conquered Odessa in 2022 with one or two Mistral large amphibious warships in their Black Sea Fleet in those early weeks of war? I think it is likely that would have been enough.

What would the war have looked like with Russian forces across the Dnieper River, supplied through Odessa, and marching north into western Ukraine while most of the Ukrainian army was pinned in the Donbas and significant forces were fighting to keep Russian troops out of Kiev? 

What would the impact of taking Zelensky's home town have been?

Would a hasty retreat of Ukraine's troops from the Donbas front to avoid being trapped on the east side of the Dnieper River have let Russia roll through eastern Ukraine even if Kiev still held?

Would that Ukrainian retreat have turned into a rout?

Would enough Ukrainians have decided Russia was the strong horse and that defecting to Russia was the key to survival? Maybe that would have been enough to tip the balance to make Russia's plan to rapidly install a puppet government in charge work out.

And if Odessa had fallen but Ukraine still kept fighting along some line north of the Black Sea coast, Ukrainian grain exports would not have been possible.

Pressure from hungry countries might have added pressure on the West to let Ukraine fall so Russia could export Ukrainian grain.

And Ukrainian morale could not have been boosted during the brutal Russian ground attacks by a naval campaign that sank Russian warships and drove them back to the eastern Black Sea.

So while I appreciated France's action at the time, who knew the impact it would have eight years later? Never let it be said that I can't compliment France.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post