Before the Russian invasion, many assumed that wars among major twenty-first-century powers, if they happened at all, would not be like earlier ones. They would be fought using a new generation of advanced technologies, including autonomous weapons systems. They would play out in space and cyberspace; boots on the ground would probably not matter much. Instead, the West has had to come to terms with another state-to-state war on European soil, fought by large armies over many square miles of territory. And that is only one of many ways that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine harks back to the two world wars.As Russia invaded Ukraine, early on I warned that modern war is not inherently short. Indeed, before even the War on Terror I warned that the Iran-Iraq War demonstrated that assumption is false:
The war as a whole showed us that modern war is not inherently brief. Arab-Israeli and Indo-Pakistani wars since World War II have misled us into thinking this is the norm. Desert Storm has seemingly confirmed this view and America now seeks a small but lethal Army that will strike hard, win fast, and come home. Yet by fighting on for years when most believed the First Gulf War would have to end rapidly, the Iraqis and Iranians have provided us with a much needed lesson that wars do not just end on their own. By simply pausing instead of furiously fighting Lemming-like until all weapons and ammunition are expended, these two states fought for nearly eight years.
As the Winter War of 2022 dragged on it has demonstrated that wars rarely end by Christmas.
And most relevant at this point because we now know wars can drag on, victories are often not complete enough to end a threat.
Sure, as that author concluded, the West should help Ukraine rebuild. But I say let's not get ahead of ourselves and assume Ukraine wins. First things first. Russia has to lose before we worry about ending Russian resolve to reverse that loss.
To prevent that, the author goes on to argue for bringing Russia in from the cold. But the author's statement that "if Western leaders are determined to treat Russia as a permanent pariah—then the future for both countries will be one of misery, political instability, and revanchism" puts too much responsibility on the West for Russia's actions.
The major question is whether Russia will continue to be and act like a pariah, self-destructively earning Western worry and hostility. Face it, we can write the future story of how a NATO effort to end Russia's pariah status by ending the war will evolve inside Russia as a stab in the back by NATO that deprived Russia of the victory it had earned--and deserved. You can look at World War I for that lesson, too.
Anyway, do read the article. It is interesting even if I disagree with the confidence that the West has the power to cause or prevent Russia from sinking into misery, political instability, and revanchism.
Or will the Winter War of 2022 be the clue bat that has a good effect on Russia? That is my scenario for ending Russia's long and pointless hostility toward the West.
UPDATE: Russia appears to be getting a beating by the Prigozhin clue bat. Will the Wagner uprising purportedly designed to change Russia's military leadership shake Russian resolve to continue the war?
I suspect Prigozhin will lose this fight. But a battle for loyalty of military and security commanders may be taking place now. Yet it doesn't seem like anybody significant is willing to openly support Prigozhin at this point.
What will that maneuvering behind the scenes result in? What more will Prigozhin try to do to persuade sympathetic leadership to openly side with him? I'm sure nobody wants to support a losing effort and end up executed by Putin's loyalists.
Even a failed coup might be a sufficient beating with the clue bat to pressure Russia to end the war. Although that might take the form of a compromise among Russian factions where Russia disavows a desire to take more land but tries to hold what it took at such a high cost so far.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
