The United States Army in the Pacific is transforming into something that isn't primarily an army.
The Army in the Pacific is changing:
The U.S. Army command for the Indo-Pacific finds itself at the front of the service’s transformation initiative, incorporating new unit types created to facilitate rapid adaptation to adversary tactics, according to U.S. Army Pacific Command chief Gen. Charles Flynn.
Several units in the Pacific, from Hawaii to Alaska, were chosen as part of Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George’s initiative, dubbed “Transforming in Contact,” Flynn said in an interview ahead of the Association of the U.S. Army’s annual conference.
Of all the units highlighted that operate across all domains--land, air, sea, space and cyberspace--one category stands out for its absence: ground combat brigades. Those legacy armored, infantry, Stryker, and airborne brigades are apparently so last century's fashion when fighting in contact was a thing. I had some hope of preparing for that, but Transforming in Contact seems to downgrade what is supposed to be an Army core capability.
It's clear that the Army in the Pacific is transforming into a non-army incapable of carrying out its core competency of large-scale ground combat operations, which as I argued in Military Review is absolutely needed in INDOPACOM to stretch China's resources. Even islands can require multiple divisions to secure. One island in particular is under threat, which could use American troops in large numbers, which I also addressed in Military Review.
The western Pacific Marines already checked out of the ground warfare mission. As the Army transforms, what service transforms to do that ground mission?
UPDATE: This essay on prioritizing preparing the Army for INDOPACOM is timely:
The complex formulae involving competition with China and assuring regional allies ultimately requires robust landpower capabilities on key terrain.
The author doesn't really address the Army's large-scale combat operations capability here, although he hints at it as the above quote indicates as does his comment that many regional allies have ground forces that dominate their military power.
The author focuses more on logistics. Which is totally fair. As I've noted, right now we are geared toward the narrow Japan-South Korea region. The logistics need to be much better to sustain a large Army operation across the broad theater. And of course the Navy and Air Force must be able to hold lines of supply to Army forces. That's a big concern of mine. For the Marines, too. And less known, other services rely on Army logistics. So crawl, walk, run, of course.
I don't think the Army should prioritize Asia. To prevent a new Bataan the Army needs the Navy and Air Force to be better first. But the Army in the Pacific certainly shouldn't be reliant on crumbs from the other theaters.
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