China may believe mass works to overwhelm a smaller enemy. And while Ukraine has the territory to give up to buy time without losing the war so far, Taiwan is geographically small enough to be vulnerable to the brutal mass and firepower methods Russia uses.
China has a lot of civilian ships built for a wartime role to invade Taiwan:
While the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) lacks the numbers of amphibious landing craft needed to stage the sort of invasion seen during the D-Day landings, it could bridge the gap with civilian vessels, including dozens of gigantic roll-on, roll-off ferries that can each carry hundreds of armoured vehicles.
I've noted this capability. While they are more vulnerable than military ships, there are a lot. Just as Russia is willing to sacrifice men in "meat wave" assaults to grind away at Ukraine, China may be willing to expend a "sushi wave" assault to make sure enough of the troops carried across the Taiwan Strait make it ashore.
And if the Chinese intend to use their air and missile power to suppress Taiwanese air defenses and anti-ship assets, the invasion will mostly come by air and not across beaches. Remember, America needs amphibious warfare ships for airmobile assaults because we aren't 100 miles from any likely targets. China itself is a giant amphibious warfare platform if Taiwan is the target.
And if the air mobile and airborne forces--supplemented by infiltrated spies and special forces, marine assaults, and even light infantry smuggled into Taiwanese ports as I speculated long ago in a scenario I think holds up pretty well as a basic outline--sow chaos in Taipei, cripple Taiwan's ability to strike ships, and delay Taiwanese ground force deployments, the civilian ships may be able to sail into Taiwanese ports to disembark behind a thin shield of Chinese light infantry without crippling losses.
While I used the Norway 1940 template, this author makes a case for Crete 1941. I'll say as the initial phase it has a lot of merit. At Crete the airborne forces did the heavy lifting. Seaborne reinforcements were stopped. But if Taiwan fights, China will need seaborne reinforcements as the Germans did in Norway.
If Taiwanese morale collapses, China wins quickly. Or China may find it has to stand fast and hold its bridgeheads (and airheads) to await reinforcements of troops and supplies. That's a lesson China identified from the World War II Guadalcanal campaign:
In a future amphibious invasion against Taiwan, just as the Marines fought off the initial Japanese counteroffensives, the PLA must anticipate stiff resistance once its forces had landed on the enemy’s beachheads. It must vigorously defend its footholds along the coast before pushing farther inland.
China may be able to build up quickly to overwhelm Taiwan's small ground forces with a relatively shallow advance before Taiwan's allies can deploy significant force to stop the Chinese offensive to take Taipei.
Or China may dig in and prepare for round two years later after building up more forces, supplies, and infrastructure ashore agree to a ceasefire, as I explored in Military Review.
People keep noting the Pentagon's appraisal that amphibious warfare is the hardest type of operation to conduct and concluding that it is impossible for China to invade Taiwan. I don't think that leap of logic is sound.
Ultimately, Taiwan needs to go to the source to eliminate the Chinese threat to Taiwan. But unless that happens, Taiwan will need to fight like Hell every step of the PLA's way in--and drive the PLA into the sea.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.