The defeat of Prigozhin's Wagner revolt wasn't the end of Russia's mercenary problem. It was the beginning.
Russia's patchwork of mercenary forces seems like a bad idea to me. It's an interesting read and I'll pull out the executive summary bullet points I think are most important for this post:
- PMCs and other mercenary groups have become key players in the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine and in projecting power abroad—most prominently in Africa.
- Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Wagner Group’s aborted mutiny created a power vacuum that is now being filled by PMCs subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other locally based formations.
- Russia’s mercenary industry is comprised primarily of siloviki-affiliated groups and formations, so-called “governors’ armies,” as well as semi-private mercenary formations owned by oligarchs and state corporations.
- The MoD has relied on various mercenary formations and PMCs at different times in Ukraine, blurring the lines between private groups and government-subordinated entities.
- Except for Wagner, Russian PMCs have achieved marginal success in Ukraine and have upset some Kremlin officials.
- The emergence of new PMCs and paramilitary formations will inevitably result in the further paramilitarization of Russian society and the general spread of violence.
- The growth of these structures may soon threaten the Putin regime’s hold on power, especially if Russian forces continue to trade heavy losses for minimal gains on the Ukrainian battlefield.
- The widespread
“privatization of force” is causing the Kremlin to lose its monopoly
over the use of force, which may trigger the Russian state’s eventual
rupture.
But in the short run, it buys time for Putin to avoid stressing Russian society by enacting a broad mobilization of civilians to continue the high-casualty model of waging war.
I was skeptical of Russia's resort to mercenaries on a large scale even before Prigozhin's Wagner revolt.
Recall Russia's "Time of Troubles":
It was a period of deep social crisis and lawlessness following the death of Feodor I, a weak and possibly intellectually disabled ruler who died without an heir. His death ended the Rurik dynasty, leading to a violent succession crisis with numerous usurpers and false Dmitrys (imposters) claiming the title of tsar.[2] Russia experienced the famine of 1601–03, which killed almost a third of the population, within three years of Feodor's death. Russia was occupied by the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth during the Polish–Russian War (also known as the Dimitriads) until it was expelled in 1612. It was one of the most turbulent and violent periods in Russian history. In just 15 years, the crown changed hands six times. Estimates of total deaths caused by the conflict range from 1 to 1.2 million, while some areas of Russia experienced population declines of over 50 percent.
Putin screwed up most fundamentally by needlessly stoking conflict with the West.
That led Russia to invade Ukraine in order to get a buffer for a non-existent threat from a weak but increasingly worried Europe. Invading Ukraine exposed the Potemkin Village nature of Putin's vaunted Red legions.
And now Putin tries to cope with his military problem with mercenaries--diffused across Russia to prevent a single rival from having the power to repeat the Wagner revolt. Which includes across the Russian government. But that "solution" to the problem of giving private entities and government ministries their own armed forces may just make sure that the chaos of mercenary forces persists for a long time once the rupture takes place.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
