I think 2024 may be the last year that Ukraine has to demonstrate it can defeat the Russian army in the field. Not so much because of America's election, but because Ukrainian war weariness will inevitably rise. Ukraine may be able to outlast Russia to victory if it retains some Western support, but that is a different path altogether.
The war goes on. And President Zelensky declares America's level of support is up to us; but is looking at building up his domestic arms industry to survive the possible loss of Western materiel support:
Zelenskyy, though, isn’t dwelling on the past but is focused on the next stage — boosting domestic arms production.
A sizeable chunk of Ukraine’s budget is allocated for that, but current output is far from enough to turn the tide of war. Now, Zelenskyy is looking to Western allies, including the U.S., to offer favorable loans and contracts to meet that goal. ...
When asked about [American political divisions on the level of aid], Zelenskyy replied bluntly that “the choice of Americans is the choice of Americans.”
In the fall of 2022 I wanted to see a large Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south following on the smaller offensive victories on the Kharkiv and Kherson fronts. I worried that failure would grant Russia time to recover from the bloodletting Putin forced his ground forces to endure. But as Churchill discovered in 1940 when he asked where the French strategic reserve was, Ukraine had no strategic reserve to inflict that blow on a seemingly reeling Russian army that had yet to dig in and lay minefields.
Failure to win despite high hopes has had an effect:
There is a subtle yet unmistakable sense of gloom in Kyiv at the moment, and not only because of the dark afternoons and plunging mercury of an eastern European November. A number of internal and external factors have combined to create perhaps the most downbeat mood about the prospects for a swift and decisive Ukrainian victory over Russia since the first weeks of the full-scale invasion.
We're getting
close to two years of war and the third is often when morale becomes too
low to confidently support war. Erosion of confidence for battlefield
victory is not the same as willingness to surrender, of course. But I've
often said that Ukrainians could decide the price of continuing to fight
is too high.
Many in the European West look at the territorial stalemate and are reflecting Democratic Party panic about Trump. The assumption is that his boast of being able to end the Winter War of 2022 in a single day means he'd cut off American military aid to Ukraine. But Trump's record doesn't support that conclusion despite some odd praise of Putin's ability to lead (and not a moral judgment as the media portrays it), in contrast to Obama's approach to Russia:
Trump encourages energy production which expanded under Obama only in areas away from Obama's prior obstruction, Trump is reinforcing American forces in Poland and Germany, including adding more tanks, reestablished Second Fleet to fight for control of the sea lines of communication between North America and Europe, reestablished a logistics command in Europe to supply forces in eastern NATO, pushed missile defenses at home and in Europe, brought non-NATO Sweden and Finland into defense preparations in the Baltic region, reinforced NATO in Romania while pushing back against Russian claims to dominate the Black Sea, rebuked the INF treaty that only America was obeying, began rebuilding American readiness and war reserve stocks, bombed Syrian chemical weapons facilities despite Russia's presence in Syria, began selling lethal weapons to Ukraine to fight Russia in the Donbas, restored our military focus on conventional warfare and our focus on great power competition that includes Russia, loudly insisted that NATO members make good on their 2014 pledge to spend more on defense, strengthened our defenses against potential Russian meddling in the 2018 election, tightened sanctions on Russia, and warned Russia to stay away from Venezuela.
Trump seems transactional in nature. Perhaps aid to Ukraine will rely more on Europeans paying for American weapons sent to Ukraine.
Perhaps there will be something akin to the "destroyers-for-bases" deal with Britain in 1940. Although I imagine instead of bases he'd want stakes in Ukrainian strategic natural resources.
Or maybe military aid would be paid for with assets seized from Russia.
But there is a lot of war to fight before our election. And the ultimate shape of the outcome may be in sight well before the winner of the 2024 American election is sworn in as president in January 2025.
UPDATE (Monday): The NATO secretary general said Ukraine's supporters should be prepared for bad news:
"Wars develop in phases," Stoltenberg said in an interview Saturday with German broadcaster ARD. "We have to support Ukraine in both good and bad times," he said.
Is this a reflection that Russia's growing initiative on the battlefield will expand? Or is it related to a Russian winter aerial campaign against Ukraine's civilian infrastructure?
UPDATE (Wednesday): Russians seem very worried about the Ukrainian operations on the eastern ("left") bank of the Dnieper River on the Kherson front. But until Ukraine can build bridges and defend them, this can't be more than a distraction. I looked at the amphibious option here.
The air defense problem is highlighted with this reporting on the operations:
The Kremlin’s main response has been to use its dominance in the air to carpet-bomb the areas where they believe the Ukrainians have footholds, hoping that the withering bombardments will dislodge them.
Air power used against Ukrainian light infantry can be used against bridges or heavy forces and logistics units crossing the river.
Or maybe Ukraine plans an operation between the Kherson front and the southern front to cross the river where once a large Kakhovka reservoir stood before the blowing of that dam at the northern edge of the Kherson front early this year (from ISW's map):
A lot of soggy ground was exposed, as that blue/white region shows. Has it dried enough for operations? Will winter freeze it hard enough? And can Ukraine mass forces and build roads to sustain a river crossing there?
UPDATE (Saturday): As the funding battle in Congress rages, at some point I think Biden wants the political stalemate to continue so he can blame Republicans for losing Ukraine. As I've occasionally pointed out:
I think Biden is accidentally supporting Ukraine. I think Biden was told Ukraine would lose fast. I think the early war shipments of anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons were designed for a post-invasion Ukrainian insurgency. The arms would be a relatively cheap way for Biden to show resolve after needlessly losing Afghanistan.
But Ukraine and Russia didn't cooperate with that political strategy. Russia effed up and Ukraine fought. Oops. Biden got trapped into backing Ukraine. And I worry he's looking for an exit ramp.
Biden would like this war over before November 2024. And I don't think he cares whether it is with victory or defeat as long as defeat can be blamed on Republicans.
UPDATE (Saturday): I'm not anywhere near defeatism:
A pall of pessimism hangs over Western supporters of Ukraine. With Kyiv’s counteroffensive underperforming most observers’ expectations, a fatalistic attitude bordering on defeatism has set in from Washington to Berlin.
But I do think Ukraine lost its best opportunity to inflict a decisive military defeat on the Russian ground forces. Attrition may yet do that to Russia, but the outcome of the war is in doubt.
The article says that Ukrainian victory goes through Crimea. I think that is right. I've long worried that trying to retake the Donbas going into the teeth of close supply sources is too hard. Excepting a collapse of the Russian ground forces. So capturing Crimea is the best Ukrainian option to win on the battlefield.
And on the other side, Crimea might be the territory that buys peace if Ukraine can't win that ground and loses hope of doing so at an acceptable price. Ukraine's outlet to the Black Sea will always be at risk as long as Russia controls Crimea. But reality may compel Ukraine to accept that vulnerability and work to cope.
But we're not there yet. The West still needs to help Ukraine win on the battlefield.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.
