Is fighting Nazis who want to destroy Holy Mother Russia all that Russia's foot soldiers expected as they see their own officers even more eager to kill them off?
The real news [from Putin's state-of-the-nation address] was an implicit message that the war in Ukraine is not ending anytime soon and that Russians must get used to living with it - especially as, in Putin’s telling, it presents an economic opportunity that’s greater than the sacrifice it requires. That Putin chose to deliver this message a year into the Russian invasion of Ukraine means he has no idea how Russia wins - and that, for want of better options, he’s decided to semaphore that he doesn’t really mind a long war.
This type of strategy is Hell on the meat pushed into the grinder. Casualty estimates (killed and wounded) by "western officials" for the Russian invasion of Ukraine:
Russia has sustained around 175-200,000 casualties, while Ukraine is considered to be at least 100,000.
Say, here's a symbolism alert from last week:
Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Wagner troops have advanced within Bakhmut near the meat processing plant[.]
Also, the wounded-to-killed ratio is estimated as 10-20:1 for Ukraine and 3:1 for Russia. That translates to over 9,000 Ukrainian KIA (I find it hard to believe it is higher than 10:1); and nearly 44,000 Russia KIA at the low end. I have no basis to judge this or any other casualty estimates.
Civilian casualties are tough to estimate. But they are lower than I expected. I imagine it is because Russia's offensive was either fast at the beginning meaning Russia didn't have to fight through cities and towns it captured; or very slow, meaning Ukraine could evacuate settled areas it defended.
Regardless of the true figures for Russia, they have been high. And Russia does not have limitless manpower resources:
The specter of limitless Russian manpower is a myth. Putin has already been forced to make difficult and suboptimal choices to offset the terrible losses his war has inflicted on the Russian military, and he will face similarly difficult choices in 2023 if he persists in his determination to use military force to impose his will on Ukraine and the West. Russia can mobilize more manpower, and Putin will likely do so rather than give up. But the costs to Putin and Russia of the measures he will likely need to take at this point will begin to mount rapidly.
I'm honestly shocked that Putin has been right so far that Russians will accept the losses.
Yet it might work because Putin essentially said that if you aren't sent into Ukraine to die, you have nothing to worry about. Head out to Russia's replacement for McDonald's and relax! That may persuade a majority to passively back the war rather than take the risk of protesting or resisting.
And if Ukraine--and its Western backers--keep giving Russia that most precious military commodity of time, the sheer size of Russia might make the strategy work. There's no guarantee Russia can exploit their population advantage, of course, but it is possible.
And Russia's chance of victory is possible because it is unlikely Ukraine can win if it does not conduct an offensive to decisively defeat the Russian army in battle and break its will to fight.
We cannot yet assume a Ukrainian victory, however, and do not know how this war will end. We cannot say that Putin has lost strategically (despite endemic Russian tactical incompetence and repeated operational failures) simply because he has not yet won.
Too many Americans are hanging the "Mission Accomplished" banner and urging us to negotiate with the Russians. Which will just help Putin achieve some type of territorial victory despite his military's heavy battlefield casualties.
UPDATE: As I noted last night, Russia's attacks after re-seizing the initiative a month ago are running out of steam (culminating). If this is it for Russia, Ukraine will have an opportunity to strike the weakened attackers:
The culmination of Russia’s current three offensive efforts will likely allow Ukrainian forces to launch counteroffensives anywhere along the frontline that they deem best suited for such operations.
But where? Or perhaps, where first? As I addressed in later updates in last week's war post, Ukraine must win somewhere. The stakes are high to achieve a visible victory.
I have focused on Zaporizhia as the best place. But in fact the best place is where Ukraine can inflict a major defeat on Russia's ground forces. The Russian army and not Ukrainian territory is the objective at this point.
The contrast is Russia's invasion that focused on taking territory instead of destroying Ukraine's ground forces. Russia has taken territory. But Russia risks losing that territory because Ukraine's army still fights. See Bakhmut for how that has worked out.
Back in 2014 when Ukraine's post-revolution military was a shadow of its current self, I advised Ukraine to preserve their army above all else if Russia invaded on a large-scale. This war Ukraine has fought for, but relinquished when necessary, territory to keep their army intact and inflict losses on the Russian army.
We'll see if there is a payoff for that strategy. There should be. But what do I know from so far away?
UPDATE: Interesting:
Ukrainian military leaders are determined to hold onto Bakhmut, Kyiv officials said Monday, even as Russian forces continued to encroach on the devastated eastern Ukrainian city that they have sought to capture for six months at the cost of thousands of lives.
This makes sense if Ukraine wants to stiff-arm Russian troops to enable the Ukrainians to break contact and cleanly pull back to new defensive lines.
But it also makes sense if Ukraine has decided this section of the front is where Ukraine will counter-attack. Letting the Russians batter at such a high-profile objective might allow Ukraine an opportunity to launch an attack to envelop and trap the Russian attackers fixated on the narrow Bakhmut front.
UPDATE: If Prigozhin is right, the Bakhmut front might very well be the best place for the first Ukrainian counteroffensive:
Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin has complained of a lack of ammunition, saying it could be "ordinary bureaucracy or a betrayal".
He alleges his Wagner Group may be being set up as the scapegoat for a Russian defeat.
UPDATE: Interesting:
Top U.S. generals met with Ukrainian military officials in Germany this week, where they evaluated battlefield options in tabletop drills ahead of an anticipated Ukrainian spring offensive meant to free their territory from Russia’s grasp.
I certainly hope we've improved our wargaming models of a year ago.
UPDATE: After the Charge of the Wagner Brigade at Bakhmut, Prigozhin warns his is not to do and die:
The leader of the Wagner Group has demanded that the Russian military send his mercenary troops ammunition immediately. Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder and leader, who is on the frontline in the fight for Bakhmut, issued the demand under a veiled ultimatum. He warned that if his troops did not receive any more ammunition, they would retreat and the entire Russian frontline would collapse.
Interesting.
UPDATE (Tuesday): An argument for making Bakhmut the first Ukrainian counteroffensive:
Badly damaging Prigozhin’s power and reputation within Russia would be an important accomplishment from the standpoint of the long-term prospects for restoring sanity in Russia.
We'll see.
UPDATE (Tuesday): This time for sure?
As for Ukraine’s chances of mounting a successful counter offensive, the west believes this will be launched within “the coming weeks and months”, after tens of thousands of Ukrainian troops have been trained in the UK and elsewhere in Europe.
And if that happens, we'll see if Russia exhausted its ground forces with attacks since it regained the initiative.
UPDATE: Hard to argue with this:
Few think that Ukraine can restore its pre-war boundaries at a single stroke, let alone take back territory, including Crimea, seized by Russia in 2014. But if Ukraine can tear another significant chunk out of the Russian occupation, as it did last year in the north-east around Kharkiv, and in the south around Kherson, it would quash the belief—expressed by General Milley, among others—that the war is doomed to stalemate.
UPDATE (Wednesday): Is this accurate? "So far the war has killed over 100,000 Russians and a about half as many Ukrainians." Interesting. And sad, of course.
How long will the Russians keep shuffling off to die in a foreign land? Hell, how long will Ukrainians be willing to die to eject the Russians?
UPDATE (Wednesday): If the reporting that Zelensky has ordered his military to send what is needed to hold Bakhmut isn't just cover for a withdrawal, the Ukrainians will absolutely need to counter-attack to prevent the Russians from squeezing out or isolating the Ukrainian troops at the tip of the small Bahkmut salient. I have no idea what the intent is.
UPDATE (Friday): If Ukraine is determined to hold Bakhmut, Ukraine will need to counter-attack to hold the line. So this is interesting:
One of Ukraine’s top military commanders visited the city of Bakhmut for the third time in less than a week, a video posted on his official Telegram account on Wednesday showed.
Could that level of interest be for the purpose of reassuring defenders inside Bakhmut that they need to hold on even if encircled?
Could Ukraine be luring Russian troops into an encirclement only to use Bakhmut's defenders as the anvil to a Ukrainian relief force's hammer?
UPDATE (Saturday): Or maybe those visits are just about sustaining the morale of Ukrainian troops who may feel like they are in a meat grinder with insufficient support.
UPDATE (Saturday): I want to believe this reflects widespread problems:
Russians sent to fight on the front lines are mutinying, fighting amongst themselves, getting locked in basements and lost in the chaos of a faltering offensive, a flurry of videos and messages from inside Vladimir Putin’s army show.
But it may be just the usual problem any army has in a tough war--but uniquely visible because of technology. It is not a sign this is true that Russian units must "round up all the 'lost' soldiers deserting, fleeing or struggling to find their teams." We do that. Those units are called Military Police.
And even if widespread, Ukraine must attack on a large scale to exploit that Russian weakness. Mud is arriving and the long-promised--since September 2022--big Ukrainian counteroffensive has yet to be carried out.
Russia's offensive failures gave Ukraine time. But during the last six months, Ukraine and its Western backers have given Russia time. More than weapons or ammo, time is the most useful thing an enemy on the ropes can use.
UPDATE (Sunday): I've noted that Russia's offensive into Ukraine followed a broad pattern from Hitler's invasion of the USSR. A broad offensive that failed to knock out the enemy. And the next year a narrower offensive in the south that also failed. That set the stage for the Soviet counter-offensive that surrounded 6th Army at Stalingrad.
At some level I hope that the long battle for Bakhmut is Putin's Stalingrad, luring an army to destruction. We'll see if the long-promised Ukrainian counteroffensive fits the pattern.
Said Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksii Danilov on state television of the city:
Our military is standing. This is our fortress. And what they are doing now, we cannot even imagine how useful it will be for the country, for our army in the near future[.]
Could be foreshadowing. Or it could be a diversion. Or it could just be efforts to bolster Ukrainian defenders under great pressure from Russia's continued attacks there.
NOTE: ISW coverage of the war continues here.
