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Friday, January 29, 2021

Everything Under the Heavens

Can an old Soviet book on exploiting sea power apply to China now? 

I read that old book in college. Russia certainly can't afford to apply that book's arguments. Russia's far greater need for land power (and the air power to support it), a declining shipbuilding industry, and a smaller economy rule that out. 

China, however, probably could gain advantage from its outline for exploiting control of the seas. It has the trade interests to and economy to justify and support a navy. China's naval power is a historical oddity, yet is threatening to surpass American capabilities:

While the U.S. Navy is stuck with a dysfunctional warship construction capability and new technology it cannot afford, the Chinese have avoided the American mistakes so far and are rapidly closing the quality gap. That includes having their new ships spend a lot of time at sea, in all seasons and weather, to gain operational experience that can be obtained no other way.

All this is the result of China concluding that it is no longer enough just to be the major land-based military power in East Asia, as they have been for thousands of years. The new Chinese economy requires that China protect its access to foreign markets and sources of raw materials. A large, modern navy would not only do that but also be capable of contesting the naval domination that West has had for centuries.

China now has a naval strategy unlike any in its history. That is one component of a Chinese strategy that involves ambitious goals on land and sea. China is seeking ownership of the South China Sea, large chunks of India and, rather quietly, the Far Eastern Russian territories. [In] addition Chinese seeks naval domination in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Going after adjacent land areas is the traditional Chinese way of expanding.

American stumbling on shipbuilding worries me more than China's growing naval power. 

I hope that China's push for decisive naval power at the expense of traditional land power needs will divide Chinese power enough to lead to defeat on land and at sea.

And in the meantime, increase the friction on the alignment of Russia and China.

China is big. But is it big enough for such ambitious goals?

And do we know how expansive China's territorial goals are?


Space Force has best think about ground forces.

Or will the weight of Chinese history eventually sink the modern Chinese fleet? After all, it is common to think China's long history gives them unique long-range planning capabilities. Maybe that history is a curse more than a gift.