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Monday, November 18, 2024

The Winter War of 2022 and the Art of the Ukraine Deal

Donald Trump will become the next president and the question of how this will affect American aid to Ukraine is obviously a big question. I see the issue as reliant on two main factors. Trump would not want to have a loss like Afghanistan on his watch. And Trump does not want America to look like a sucker for paying too much for what benefits Europe, too.

For now the war goes on, and the Biden administration is accelerating appropriated military aid to Ukraine, hoping to commit it before Trump is sworn in. Then the question is what Trump's policy will be.

First of all, the foundation of our options should be preventing Europe from being a platform to threaten America. That has been a longstanding problem for America that America's growing power only allowed it to seriously affect a little over a century ago.

This should mean America remains strongly involved in NATO but with Europeans picking up more of the defense slack. This keeps Russia away from the Atlantic at a lower cost than the Cold War required. And prevents the rise of the proto-imperial European Union that would eventually be a threat.

Second, Biden's approval and reputation abroad took a big hit when he needlessly lost the Afghanistan War in the mistaken belief that American desire to end that war included support for any path including abandoning the Afghanistan government, letting the Taliban win and capture a lot of American military equipment intended to fight the Taliban. 

And third, let's not pretend that ending the war is solely in American hands. As much as I believe Russia could crack first, Russia has the initiative on the battlefield and so Ukraine could break. No matter how much Ukraine wants its territory back, after nearly three years of war with no sign Russia can be pushed out, how much longer will Ukrainians be willing to fight even with massively escalated American military aid?

Yes, I remain perplexed that a lot of Republicans oddly came to oppose aiding Ukraine too much--or even at all. But when faced with defeat in Europe, some of that opposition to aid may well be superseded by horror at losing, if the Afghanistan defeat is any predictor. Given the highly partisan nature of our politics these days, other Republicans who oppose aid to Ukraine will tolerate or support continued aid. Welcome back to the party, eh?

Further, as I explained in that "perplexed" link above, I believe Biden only accidentally supported Ukraine in his belief that token arms for an insurgency and accepting a Ukrainian government-in-exile as Russia overran Ukraine would be enough to show this time--unlike in Afghanistan--America tried to do the right thing. Growing Democratic reversion to an anti-war stance on Ukraine--remember how Afghanistan went from their "good war" to just another bad one to "end"--will make it easier for Trump to find a way to support Ukraine.

I of course will not change my views on defense and national security issues based on political changes.  I've certainly changed my mind on some issues. Changing facts can require that. But you can certainly see that I don't blow with political winds given I have blogged since 2002.

I firmly believe "ending" the Winter War of 2022 should not mean that Ukraine loses the war. The problem is whether preventing Ukraine from losing now with a deal actually secures Ukraine or simply provides a decent interval before Russia resumes the war in a better military position than Ukraine.

Basically, does Trump let Putin get away with pretending the war is ended without any withdrawal; or does Trump react by arming Ukraine to the teeth?

The former risks Russia resuming the war sooner rather than later, possibly against a Ukraine demoralized by the losses it suffered without reclaiming any land it has lost since 2014.

And if the latter, how is the aid structured to be transactional and beneficial to America as well as to Ukraine? By using frozen Russian assets in the West? By deals that are paid with loans (and let future leaders decide if and how the loans are repaid)? By deals paid for by Europeans unable to increase their own defense industry to replace some of our weapons and munitions? By getting percentages of economic assets or strategic materials inside Ukraine as payment for arms that Ukraine says it must have to win?

Face it, a lot of ways exist for arms to flow to Ukraine without it being "aid" on our financial ledger. Including a peace deal that "sells" Crimea to Russia--plus back rent--and uses frozen Russian assets to pay Ukraine a high price for the lost territory that Ukraine can use to rebuild Ukraine. Heck, maybe that formula extends to pre-2022 Donbas conquests because Ukraine doesn't really want pro-Russian people inside Ukraine as a Fifth Column. Could Putin sell either as a victory that allows him to withdraw from Ukrainian territory captured since 2022?

Heck, Trump the deal maker might be entering office with really good timing to get a good deal:

The Kremlin's recent economic policies indicate that the Russian economy will likely face significant challenges in 2025 and that Russian President Vladimir Putin is worried about Russia's economic stability in the long term.

And:

A recent Russian state-affiliated poll suggests that most Russian residents feel largely unaffected by the war in Ukraine, supporting reports of growing concerns among Russian officials and elites that many citizens remain indifferent towards the war.

Remember, the idea that Trump is in thrall to Putin is refuted by comparing his record to Obama's. If that myth shapes your view on what Trump will do, the foundation of your opinion is weak. Given that Russia needs American friendship much more than America needs Russian friendship, Trump could get a very good deal for any so-called "reset." And if Ukraine is kept strong enough after the guns fall silent (I won't call it "peace"), the high losses Russia has endured may well--as it did in the original 1939-1940 Winter War that kept Finland independent--deter Russia from reigniting the war because it has bigger problems to cope with.

Trump might carry out policies in regard to Ukraine that I strongly oppose. But I don't think that the factors shaping Trump's policies mean that is likely. We'll see.

UPDATE (Monday): Related thoughts. I don't know how I missed it unless it only recently was added here. 

UPDATE (Tuesday) I think this is an accurate assessment at the thousand-day mark, as artificial as this mark is:

Russia is expending huge amounts of weaponry and human life to make small-but-steady territorial gains to the nearly one-fifth of Ukraine it already controls. Ukraine, meanwhile, is struggling to minimize losses, maintain morale and convince allies that, with more military aid, it can turn the tide. 

But implicit in that assessment is that the cost to Russia is a struggle for it to maintain, too. Yes, Putin is willing to pay that price. But can Russia cover his bloody check made in the currency of their lives?

UPDATE (Tuesday): I find this a fascinating inversion from the reason tanks were invited over a century ago--shielding infantry from growing battlefield firepower:

The Russian military command has likely assessed that offsetting Ukraine's drone advantages and reducing Russian armored vehicle losses through urban combat is worth the large numbers of Russian casualties that will come from grinding, attritional advances in frontline towns and cities.

The cogs will just have to turn and break their teeth on command. Can't risk those ancient T-62s, eh?

UPDATE (Wednesday): America now allows Ukraine to use ATACMS missiles in Russian territory around the Kursk salient:

Ukrainian forces struck the Russian military's 67th Main Military and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) arsenal of the 1046th Logistics Support Center near Karachev on the night of November 18 to 19 and that the strike caused an initial detonation and 12 secondary explosions.

This is not an American escalation and provocation that will lead to nuclear war between America and Russia. Russia is loudly complaining to frighten Westerners into limiting Western support. The big escalation was Russia's invasion of Ukraine in the first place.

UPDATE (Thursday): Regarding my Crimea proposal mentioned and linked in the main body, I've long said Ukraine may not want to pay the price to drive the Russians out:

Zelenskiy, interviewed by Fox News on a train in Ukraine and broadcast on Wednesday, said his country could not afford to lose the number of lives that would be required to retake Crimea through military means.

Ukraine needs our military aid and financial help. But Ukraine bleeds.

Maybe a peace plan requires Russia to withdraw from all Ukrainian territory in exchange for Ukraine remaining outside of NATO. It would be a well-armed Ukraine that cooperates with NATO. But not an alliance member with other NATO facilities or combat units inside Ukraine. If Russia declines that bargain, Ukraine enters NATO.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.

NOTE: I made the image with Bing.