Just as the 2006 Hezbollah War began with a war on jihadis in Gaza, the war Hamas began with its murder, rape, and kidnapping invasion of Israel on October 7, 2023 has become a Hezbollah War.
The major military operations of the Last Hamas War are seemingly in the past. Securing the win is the problem. Can Israel teach Gazans to elect good leaders and appreciate what that can do for them?
Since Monday when I last updated my previous post covering the war, the signs of an Israeli invasion have multiplied:
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that it began a "targeted and delimited ground operation in southern Lebanon" on September 30. The IDF said that ground forces will operate to target Hezbollah fighters and infrastructure in villages along the Israel-Lebanon border. The IDF said that Hezbollah infrastructure in these villages represents an “immediate and real” threat to Israeli communities in the north. Israeli military and political officials formally approved the ”next steps” of Israel’s operation in Lebanon on September 30. The IDF said it will act to achieve its stated war aim of returning the residents of the north to their homes.
To me, the reports of Israeli small-scale operations over the last week are recon; and the more overt crossings reported yesterday are units marking lanes across the border. They're essentially creating bridgeheads with any obstacles or mines cleared in order to pass the invasion force through.
As we watch Israel wage serious war on Hezbollah, let's recall the last time they fought on 2006:
His research convincingly argues that the Israeli reliance on poorly understood and controversial Effects-Based Operations (EBO) and Systemic Operational Design (SOD) warfighting theories, and a nearly singular dependence on air power, were root causes of Israeli problems. Additionally, after years of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Gaza Strip and West Bank territories, IDF ground forces were tactically unprepared and untrained to fight against a determined Hezbollah force that conducted what was, in many ways, a conventional, fixed-position defense.
Hopefully the Israelis have fixed those deficiencies. I've long suspected Israel would need to go deep in a multi-division and lengthy raid into Lebanon to dig out the entrenched Hezbollah presence in Lebanon:
I assume that any war will be a multi-division push north of the Litani that will take advantage of the fact that Hezbollah, after 2006, wrongly believes it can go toe-to-toe with Israeli troops and so will fight as light infantry rather than as insurgents. For a while, Israel will be able to really pound Hizbollah ground forces as the Israelis take over rocket-launch sites and armories with troops.
Further, I'd guess the Israelis will push rapidly into the Bekaa Valley as far as Baalbek to tear up Hezbollah's rear area to slow down rearmament after the war is over. Air strikes would take place north of that, if necessary, I'd guess.
Do that and perhaps Lebanon will have a chance to eliminate Iran's influence through Hezbollah which has crippled their once-prosperous country.
Even as this phase of Israel's wars against its enemies continues, I have to wonder if Israel's resolve extends to taking down the Gordian Knot that makes Israel's problems so much worse.
UPDATE: Iran may get involved:
Israeli military spokesman Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari said Israel had not identified any launches from Iran as of Tuesday afternoon. Iran’s state media has not suggested an attack is imminent, and Iranian officials could not be immediately reached for comment.
To be fair, Iran isn't saying it would strike. This may just be Israel brushing Iran back from the plate.
Or heck, I can't rule out that Israel's apparent intent to invade Lebanon to get at Hezbollah is bait in order to get an excuse to hit Iran's nuclear infrastructure. That won't solve the Iran problem. But it buys time.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
NOTE: I'm also writing on Substack, with The Dignified Rant: Evolved.