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Monday, July 15, 2024

The Winter War of 2022 Approaches Karbala V Losses

At some point, Russia's ground forces will lose the will to die in large numbers for meager gains. Will we recognize that shift?

I ask if we will see Russian morale break because in the Iran-Iraq War, Iran's cannon fodder hopped up on Shia Islamist fervor developed a reputation for disregarding casualties. It was widely thought that it was just a matter of time before Iraq's army broke under the strain. And yet, as I wrote in this old summary of my Iran-Iraq War manuscript, nobody saw the change that happened after Iran's massive Karbala V offensive:

Iran's September 1986 Karbala Two and Three offensives in Kurdistan and at Fao, respectively, failed to move the Iraqi lines. And despite Iranian hopes, nobody rose up in Iraq to overthrow Hussein, thus keeping the burden on Iran to attack again. On Christmas Eve, Iran struck again big in the south. Karbala Four sent 60,000 Pasdaran across the Shatt al-Arab north and south of Khorramshahr. This time Iraq responded promptly and after 48 hours of furious fighting, threw the Iranians back across the river.

Iran's next big effort followed quickly. It was truly the "mother of all battles" and reflected the worst impulses of Iran's non-army high command by its directness and bloody-mindedness. Before the offensive, Rafsanjani exhorted volunteers heading for the battle:

Our aim is to completely destroy the Iraqi war machine. Here, near Basra, Saddam can not do anything but fight, for the fall of Basra is tantamount to his own death. We want to settle our accounts with Iraq at Basra's gates, which will open and pave the way for the final victory we have promised.

On January 8, 1987, Karbala Five signaled its beginning when waves of Iranians rushed the Iraqi lines northwest of Khorramshahr. As Rafsanjani predicted, the Iraqis stood their ground and fought. Final victory was not, however, the result. In standing to fight, the Iraqis gunned down the Iranians who stubbornly attacked in the face of crippling losses as they slowly shoved the Iraqis back. By January 22, 1987, the Iranians had advanced to within ten kilometers of Basra, the objective on which Iran pinned her hopes of victory. By the fourth week of the offensive, Iran's attack force was spent and the Iranians dug in to hold their exposed positions at the outskirts of Basra. Iraq's counter-attack called upon all the available reserves and smashed the Iranians to end the offensive for good. Perhaps 20,000 Iranians died in the battle. Iraq's casualties were about half of Iran's. Iraq's performance is notable in that Iraq withstood and won the kind of brutal bloodletting that supposedly only Iran could endure. Observers at the time saw only that Iran had launched yet another in a seemingly endless series of big offensives. They speculated about how many more of these attacks Iraq could endure. Actually, Iran broke at Karbala Five. It would be many months before observers began to wonder what was wrong with Iran when no further attacks were begun, yet it was true that the "Islamic Revolution bled to death in Karbala V."

Right now we keep looking for a major Russian summer 2024 offensive and marvel that Russia continues to bleed out on multiple fronts with small attacks that seemingly reflect absolute lack of concern about casualties.

Iran, too, claimed to be unfazed by losses:

In October, the Iranians claimed to have troops massed for another try at Basra and on November 1, 1987, Rafsanjani stated that no settlement with Iraq was possible until Iran struck a decisive blow. Three days later, Iran declared a week of mobilization and issued demands that Iraq be labeled the aggressor in the war and that Iraq pay reparations. Iran added that she might keep some of the Iraqi land she held at that point. Given the nearly ten months that had passed since the most recent final offensive, these were strong words indeed.
Iran didn't get the chance to make good on its bravado. Yet it is true that the war would be decided by ground forces--Iraqi ground forces:

While Iran continued to insist that ultimately it would be infantry who would decide the war, Iran had already let the usual season pass without launching a major offensive. This failure began to raise questions about what Iran was doing. One answer came in April 1988 when, after fewer than two days of fighting, Iraq recaptured the Fao peninsula with Operation Ramadan. Iraqi regular troops and Republican Guard forces backed by 2,000 tanks and 600 heavy guns plowed south and struck from the Gulf with a supporting amphibious assault. The Iranians were overwhelmed and showed no spirit of resistance. While it is true that the Iraqis outnumbered the Iranians by 8 to 1 odds, the contrast is amazing between April 1988 and February 1986, when Iranians fought hammer and tong for every square inch of worthless swamp on that peninsula. The day that Iranian infantry could not exact a heavy price for the terrain on which they stood was the day that Iran lost the war. April 18, 1988 was that day.

Is Russia's army in danger of breaking after its heavy casualties? Russia certainly doesn't have troops with the same level of fervor that Iran deployed from 1980 to early 1987. But even Iran didn't lose troops at the rate Russia is losing troops:

Russia has lost more than 70,000 troops in the past two months, British military intelligence said on Friday.

The update by the Ministry of Defence added that the heavy losses would likely continue as Russia looked to make gains across the front lines in Ukraine.

But if Russia's ground forces do break, as I've noted repeatedly Ukraine has to attack to reveal and exploit that possible fact. Iraq was able to do that in 1988 because it had greatly enlarged its army, including expanding the Republican Guard regime protection loyalists into a large offensive force. That was key because much of Iraq's army was optimized to hold their fortifications line and incapable of carrying out offensive mobile operations.

Are we even looking for signs? Or do we take Russian bravado at face value and assume Russia's infantry will one day decide the war--on offense?

UPDATE (Tuesday): This is true:

The numerous daily Russian attacks on Ukraine are having a cumulative impact on the latter's fighting force, according to a former [Australian] general who has called for Kyiv's allies to step up their support in the fight against Vladimir Putin's aggression.

But to inflict those losses Russia is losing even more. And it is wrong to say Russia can endure more because it is much larger. If that was true, Iran would have beaten Iraq. Hell, the USSR and America would have beaten Afghan insurgencies. America would have defeated North Vietnam. And China would have beaten South Korea and American-led UN forces.

People are not disposable cogs, no matter how much Putin treats them like that.

UPDATE (Thursday): So what's going on with Ukraine's Kherson front?

Russian sources claimed on July 17 that Ukrainian forces have withdrawn from positions in Krynky in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, although ISW has not observed confirmation of these claims.

UPDATE (Friday): Russia keeps grinding forward:

Ukraine’s army has pulled out from the village of Urozhaine in the eastern Donetsk region, an official said Thursday, surrendering another front-line position as Russian forces blast Ukrainian defenses in a relentless onslaught.

Ukraine is trading space for time. But space is not infinite. What is Ukraine doing with its time? 

UPDATE (Friday): I've had this tabbed and finally got around to reading it. The author notes that Russia expected a short and glorious invasion in 2022; and Ukraine expected a decisive counteroffensive in 2023. Neither got what they expected:

The promise of a short war is seductive. Putin certainly never expected to be bogged down indefinitely. He has managed to sell his war of attrition to the Russian people as a great patriotic struggle against the West. But the dogs he has unleashed could still turn around and bite him.

I hope so. But I'd like Ukraine to do something to prod the dogs rather than just hope.

NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.

NOTE: I'm now on Substack, with The Dignified Rant: Evolved.