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Tuesday, March 12, 2024

Stunning and Shredding the Enemy

Was lack of air power the reason Ukraine's 2023 Big Counteroffensive failed? 

There are lots of reasons why the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive failed. Too few Ukrainian troops. Too little Western equipment, meaning Ukraine's new units couldn't afford to take losses. Too little training. Lack of command and control capacity. The end of tank dominance. The revival of Russian morale. Drones. Russian mobilization. Russian minefields. Russian fortifications in depth. Russian artillery with ample ammunition. And of course, lack of Ukrainian close air support?

Is this why Ukraine failed?

Ukraine's summer 2023 counteroffensive sputtered. Why? As a tank officer, I blame lack of close air support by manned aircraft providing flexible close air support (CAS). CAS was vital to German blitzkrieg; it is integral to U.S./NATO AirLand Battle. Newer buzzwords exist, but basically, flyboys bomb them and stun them, and then tanks and armored infantry bust the gaps as artillery and air shred them.

I don't know about that. One, why didn't our advice after wargaming the counteroffensive warn the Ukrainians to hold off? Obviously we thought the counteroffensive could work without CAS since we did not think providing air power to Ukraine was that important compared to other capabilities.

I think blaming the lack of close air support confuses means and results. The key was stunning the enemy and then shredding them with firepower so mechanized forces can bust the gaps.

Of course, despite a renewed bout of "tanks are obsolete" talk over the last two years, something needs the mobility, firepower, and protection to bust the gaps.

But I digress.

The German blitzkrieg needed air power to mass accurate firepower that far forward. Really, the Stuka dive bomber was the first precision weapon, no?

And we've used air power because we've had air supremacy ever since 1944 on every battlefield we've fought on. After the Cold War, we cut lots of our artillery units, making our troops even more reliant on air power.

My view is that the type of firepower used to stun or shred is--and should be--irrelevant to the troops in contact.

We think stealth means that 5th generation aircraft can continue to be the means of stunning the enemy. The Russians don't think that way. They don't have stealth aircraft.

I have no doubt that air power can stun and can aid in shredding. Because we've had a near-monopoly on that capability since 1944. But with ground-based fires extending their reach, I don't think air power is the sole means. Let's focus on the stunning and shredding without deciding ahead of time what can do those jobs.

UPDATE: It is interesting that Russia is turning to air power to bombard Ukrainian troops recently, despite plane losses:

Russia’s air force has dramatically boosted its effectiveness in the Ukraine war with its increased use of “glide bombs,” contributing to Moscow’s recent battlefield successes, according to Western experts.

Why? For some time it seemed like Russia was preserving its air force for emergencies. Which would included a Chinese attack on Russia.

But now Russia is routinely using air power and Ukraine is making Russia pay a price.  

UPDATE: The Army has cancelled its 58-caliber Extended Range Cannon Artillery project:

The problems with the cannon were mostly related to the length of the gun tube and its ability to withstand a large number of projectiles without excessive wear to the gun tube.

The need remains.

NOTE: The image was made from DALL-E.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.