Should the Army transition away from armed helicopters over the battlefield?
Optimist that I am, I'm happy the Army program to develop a scout helicopter was only a $11 billion waste of effort:
The U.S. Army has spent more than $11 billion on failed attempts to develop a new scout helicopter. The scout helicopter was meant to find targets for the larger and heavily armed AH-64 helicopter. Apparently, no one involved with this research and development effort bothered to find out how other branches of the U.S. military as well as foreign armed forces were dealing with this problem. Even though the U.S. Army has established a system (CALL) to document past failures and successes and that this CALL system was easily available, commanders and staff personnel often did not use it as they made mistakes that CALL had documented and warned about not repeating. ...
Because of the Ukraine War CALL now has a lot of useful advice on the use and abuse of UAVs.
What is the fate of attack helicopters in the face of air defense systems?
In Ukraine, using long-range missiles that exceed the range of infantry air defense weapons, Russian helicopters were effective when firing from behind friendly lines. I've read that both sides will fly low to evade air defenses and then tilt up to loft unguided rockets like an expensive--if mobile--multiple rocket launcher with dumb warheads. But if either had effective fighter aircraft high above with the ability to target helicopters in the ground clutter, would even those tactics fail?
I've wondered about this issue ever since the Iraq War when a massed AH-64 deep strike went awry when coordination with artillery broke down. Instead of suppressing enemy air defenses, the artillery alerted the Iraqis who then peppered the American helicopters as they struck deep. I was doubtful but prepared to listen to Army judgment. I guess the Army judged the aircraft isn't worth additional efforts to make it work. Maybe the Army paid attention to Japan's decision to switch from helicopters to drones (UAVs), which I noted in that post above about the fate of attack helicopters.
Yes, that 2003 strike was a failure of tactical execution. But even if modern conditions don't preclude a good strike, I wonder if they are worth the effort given alternatives. The Army is adapting to Air Force lack of interest in close air support that will lose hard-learned capabilities. The Army would like its own long-range fires.
And with accurate ground-based fire more possible out to longer ranges, will the Army ghost armed helicopters that were once the only option allowed to it? Did the Army love the one it was with because it couldn't be with the one it loved?
It would be interesting to see what the Army chose to produce for fire support if it had the authority over everything providing fire support for troops over the battlefield.
Perhaps the Army needs to accept the lesson that without stand-off capabilities, expensive air capabilities are a waste over a modern battlefield--even when they work--if you can instead use ground-based fires--including armed drones controlled from the ground.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
