Whose Access Will Be Denied?

What's the point of defeating China's weapons designed to keep America away from China's coastal regions? Is the proper American response to create our own version to keep China's navy penned in west of the first island chain that stands between China and the open seas?

This author has a great point about China's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD):

Yet, our core challenge is not actually how to pop that A2AD bubble; we do not actually want to seize and hold any territory currently held by the People’s Liberation Army. It is actually the inverse: how can we create our own robust anti-access aerial denial around our bases and allies, with our own cost advantages?  

I've certainly noted the need for a purpose for penetrating China's A2/AD envelopes:

I've been puzzled that Air-Sea Battle efforts to penetrate Chinese anti-access weapons in order to operate near China haven't really said what we'd do with the ability to operate near China[.]

So penetrating China's A2/AD bubbles only makes sense if American follow-on operations exploit the defeat of China's A2/AD assets rather than just sailing around off of China.

Certainly, one can imagine scenarios that would justify an American land forces presence inside China short of trying to conquer China.

And while America has no interest in seizing and holding any territory China holds prior to war, what about Chinese conquests during the war?

There are defensive reasons for penetrating China's A2/AD bubbles: supplying and assisting our allies within the bubbles. Abandoning them could lead them to fall out of our alliance even if China cannot conquer them.

And depending on where the campaign area is, penetrating the A2/AD bubbles could be necessary to assist allies with American land power on China's periphery, as I explored in that Military Review article.

Yes, I recognize that pinning China's fleet in their coastal areas with our own A2/AD assets is a great idea.

Using the Marines to man this wall across the islands of the Western Pacific is certainly valuable. But land power's core contribution to war has to be for controlling land in larger campaigns:

A Navy-Marine ulcer can certainly inflict damaging and disproportionate casualties on the Chinese navy if the PLAN pushes out to the first island chain. But it won't prove to be deadly if China can pull back in the face of America's kill web, and still hold off direct attacks on China. 

Ultimately, it is not enough even to be able to sail at will close to China. The Navy and Marine effort must ultimately enable a major ground campaign around China's periphery. Just as 19th century British naval supremacy enabled Wellington's "ulcer" campaign ashore.

Posing a threat to China itself on the ground in cooperation with China's ground enemies is the way to make the ulcer debilitating and pressure China to end their war.

Don't be comforted by the idea that all America needs to do is keep China from breaking out into the central Pacific. Too many of our allies needed to hold the line are a battlefield between China's A2/AD shield and our developing shield. At some point we need to exploit the victory of our shield, break China's shield, and exploit that access to help our allies vulnerable to Chinese pressure.

NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.

NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.