Ukraine is attacking along the front and making small gains. But without committing more than a few of the new and rebuilt brigades. So far the Russians are holding the line. But they have had to strip troops from Kherson. And Russia had a distraction at home. So ... we wait for something significant to happen.
Nothing decisive has visibly happened on the front despite the start of the Big Push counteroffensive. But Ukraine is moving and destroying:
The Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine continues to advance. There are a growing number of armed Ukrainian partisans operating in Russian occupied territory. The partisans are concentrating on destroying or damaging rail and road transportation networks as well as destroying Russian supplies. Sometimes this is done by revealing to Ukraine where key Russian supplies are stored.
Long-range Ukrainian weapons can hit those revealed targets behind Russian lines. And perhaps Ukraine is hollowing out the Russian defenders by advancing to identify targets for firepower to destroy. But the Russians are only being pushed back slowly.
But rather than being deliberate attrition, maybe this is just an example of what happens when you give your enemy time. Ukraine may have had no choice but to delay its counteroffensive for so long given the slow pace of Western arms deliveries. But regardless of the reason, Russia was given the precious gift of time to prepare.
Ukraine is attacking around Bakhmut in the east, which Wagner mercenaries captured after a long bloody offensive. Wagner turned over defensive duties to the Russian military. It would look bad for the Russian military to lose the city. So Russia will send reinforcement to hold it. I assume Ukraine's attacks here are diversionary.
The southern front is probably going to be the site of the main effort for the counteroffensive when Ukrainian probes find a weak point. I assume the ideal objective is Melitopol.
I further assume the western Kherson front is a supporting effort. That may kick off once Russia pulls more forces from the Kherson front to stabilize the southern front in the face of a Ukrainian main effort. Unless Ukraine has figured out how to use boats and helicopters to get a significant force across the Dnieper River before that trigger. And then supply it and defend the supply line with air defense assets. That seems unlikely. But Ukraine has also had a lot of time to prepare. So I'm unwilling to rule it out.
Meanwhile, Russia's home front is simmering:
The economy (GDP) shrank by two percent in 2022 and is headed for a 3.8 percent decline in 2023. The deficit spending has caused high inflation and a growing number of Russians can’t afford to buy essential items. The percentage of Russians living below the poverty line is now more than 60 percent.
The Wagner Revolt raised the pot to a boil for a day. What happens next inside Russia or on the battlefields in Ukraine?
I know we're supposed to be patient. Ukraine's troops are the ones dying--not us. They have their own timetable and plan. But patience exercised long enough can become indistinguishable from stalemate. That's not good for Ukraine, either.
UPDATE (Tuesday): I continue to worry that Russian shortages on the front are deliberate as Russia scrapes together equipment, ammo, officers, and NCOs to build a new offensive force. The longer it takes Ukraine to inflict a major defeat on Russia's ground forces, the more likely it is that such a force can be completed and sent to renew the Russian offensive.
UPDATE (Tuesday): As long as this is accurate and Ukraine is successfully doing it, that's fine for now:
Ukrainian forces appear to be focusing on creating an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains, while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment.
If Ukraine hollows out Russia's defenders, eventually the line will be thin enough to crack open.
But if that takes too much time, what will Russia have done with that time?
UPDATE (Thursday): Has Russia lost half of its combat capability during the war? Is it incapable of launching a counteroffensive against Ukraine's offensive? Interesting.
If Russia has lost half of its combat capability, the vast majority of the loss is from the ground forces. So the counteroffensive capability assessment is plausible. Am I worrying for nothing about Russia scraping together a major counteroffensive force?
Further, is Russia's apparent stout defense a Potemkin defense that is essentially a crust with little behind it? If so, the apparent stalemate could end dramatically if Ukraine keeps pushing.
Or maybe Ukraine's offensive is failing. I just can't tell from the news.
Sorry I can't make a prediction.
UPDATE (Thursday): This author thinks Ukraine can win but there will be nothing dramatic:
Even if Ukraine’s progress this summer is only moderate, Russia is still tied down in an expensive ‘forever war’ that will gradually exhaust it. In time, the constant strain will make withdrawal ever more attractive. This is how the Afghans defeated the Soviet army in the 1980s and is likely what will happen in this war.
I admit I've hoped for a rapid advance following a Russian troop morale collapse. But I've hoped that since September 2022 even as I warned that failure of Ukraine to attack gives Russia time to recover and prepare.
UPDATE (Thursday): Are 180,000 Russian troops really massing in the Donbas, ready to resume an offensive if Ukraine commits its reserves to the south? That certainly feeds my longstanding worry that Russia has starved the front of resources to build a reserve, gambling the frontline will mostly hold.
If so, the authors think it is unlikely they are trained or equipped. They may be there to draw Ukrainian forces there for a fight. That puts Russia close to lines of supply--as I've noted. And it diverts Ukraine from the key Crimea objective that Russia has more trouble supplying.
It bears repeating this quote I've used before:
Man cannot tell but Allah knows
How much the other side was hurt.
Although I remember the secondary source I read used "is hurt". But the point remains.
UPDATE (Friday): Just as I'm wondering if Russia's front line is brittle notwithstanding Ukraine's slow progress, ISW writes:
The deployment of almost the entirety of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces and extensive SMD elements to the frontline in southern Ukraine suggests that Russian defenses in southern Ukraine may be brittle.
The only reserve may be a single brigade that has been damaged in battle.
UPDATE (Sunday): Just going to say it seems as if Ukrainian troops are pushing the Russians back a little more lately. Still slow. But Ukraine also hasn't really committed its reserve, it seems. Is a thin Russian crust getting too thin to hold? Or is this a false dawn of Russian troops being between prepared fortified lines?
NOTE: ISW coverage of the war continues here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
