Maybe a ceasefire in Ukraine will be necessary because it is the least-bad option. But don't delude yourself that this is a good option we should pursue now.
Ever since Ukraine survived the initial invasion and it became clear Russia could not conquer Ukraine, Westerners have sought to get Ukraine to give up trying to liberate their territory. Ukraine's slow counteroffensive is reviving those calls:
It is a truism that wars are not won in a day, but critics of aid to Ukraine are using the current offensive’s slow progress to once again demand that Ukraine give up in order to end the war. The argument now is that Ukraine’s current struggles mean the war is in a deadlock. It will grind on, World War I-style, until the U.S. defunds Ukraine and forces it to make concessions. Variations of this argument have been floating around since last summer when longtime U.S. foreign policy observer Henry Kissinger counseled the same thing.
Yet if pursuing negotiations is a gamble, it is one with low risks and high potential rewards. Failure would merely yield the same result as doing nothing. Success, however, could preserve Ukraine, allay wider fears for democracy, deter further Russian aggression, and put fears of escalation to rest. The kind of stable, durable peace the Korean armistice produced would be a victory not just for Ukraine and its supporters but for the entire world, as well.
Before the war I said I wouldn't be shocked at this outcome:
Sometimes I wonder if the end point of the Ukraine crisis is an East Ukraine under Russian control and a West Ukraine admitted to NATO and the EU.
But I would not make this Plan A. I don't see the low risk aspect of this model. The risk is that the chance for victory is forfeited to show "sincerity" for negotiations by halting Ukrainian offensive action.
And potential rewards--assuming the above flaw doesn't simply cause Ukraine to lose the war--require a lot from America and our allies and a lot of time to potentially see those benefits.
The Korea model the author proposes and spends a lot of time describing its background and path, is only somewhat attractive after 70 years of fragile semi-war with major war hanging over us all that time. And it required a lot of American troops to hold that line. And nukes now cloud that model.
I
don't know if we can yet conclude the Korea model worked for South
Korea. Although I'm optimistic after all this time.
The ceasefire and partition model failed in Vietnam.
Also, how's Cyprus working out?
Heck, how did partition in Ukraine work since 2014-2015?
Sure, partition worked in Germany in 1945. After a long and expensive Cold War struggle with nuclear war hanging over it. And the victory is somewhat tarnished given united Germany's refusal to stand up for the West.
The record of partition to hold off an aggressive state that wants to conquer all of the partitioned state isn't terribly appealing to me.
Although I concede that for NATO, that partition option might work out as long as NATO uses the time Ukraine has purchased to arm up rather than revert to sticking our head in a hole. But that isn't obviously beneficial to Ukraine. And that path risks a feeling of Ukrainian betrayal by NATO gives Russia an opening to subvert Ukraine's current pro-Western leanings and divide its people, making them vulnerable to Russian attack.
Also, I find this amusing in a frightening sort of way from the partition article:
Washington should bear in mind that its stakes in Ukraine are lower than its stakes were in Korea. It is hard to imagine that any American president would commit U.S. forces to fight alongside Ukrainian ones.
Wait. What?
The Korea model is one of America standing shoulder-to-shoulder with South Korea against the North Korea threat. Now the author says Ukraine won't get that major feature of the ceasefire--American troops on the DMZ--that gave us the success the author seeks in Ukraine?
How would partition of Ukraine be more than temporary to allow Russia time to rearm if we go into this proclaiming Ukraine is outside of the NATO defensive perimeter? Wasn't the author's long description of the Korea ceasefire based on China accepting it could not outlast America's commitment to fight?
And don't be so sure washing our hands of Ukraine after a ceasefire will keep NATO out of a new Russo-Ukraine war because our stakes are allegedly so low. America committed hundreds of thousands of troops and suffered tens of thousands of casualties to defend South Korea, a new country America had declared outside our defensive perimeter before North Korea invaded.
I reject the Korea model for Ukraine. It would give Putin a badly needed win despite his dismal record of protecting Russia. Until the Korea model is the least-bad option, anyway.
And for a bonus reason to reject the proposal, if you think a partition despite Russia's heavy casualties will discourage China from invading Taiwan, you aren't correctly judging the question of what a Chinese victory is.
UPDATE (Wednesday): Another appeal for partition. This time using the post-World War II Germany model. To be fair, the author says it would not be "ideal." As I said, I'll only consider it when it is the least-bad option.
But I worry that a new cold war centered on a divided Ukraine will lock Russia into actin as if NATO is an enemy. And China might decide subsidizing Russia to lock that in might be worthwhile.
I'd rather have Russia defeated so that perhaps a big whack with the clue bat will help Russia admit China is the real threat to Russia.
NOTE: Thanks to that Canadian NATO delegation who made the model for my meme.
NOTE: ISW coverage of the war continues here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
