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Monday, April 03, 2023

A Real Peace Plan for the Winter War of 2022 is Victory

Real peace in Europe goes through Russia's clear battlefield defeat of their territorial aggression against Ukraine. The West needs to stop being Russia's safety net.

"Ending" the Winter War of 2022 before Russia is pushed back is no end to the war--just a pause for Russia to rearm and renew the war from positions farther west:

The many people currently proposing peace plans may well have good intentions, but they are delusional if they believe Putin will be satisfied with relatively modest territorial gains in eastern and southern Ukraine. In reality, any concessions will merely whet his imperial appetite while convincing him of the West’s fundamental weakness.

And arguing a ceasefire with Ukrainian territorial losses will be balanced by a Russian commitment to respecting Ukraine fails on the 1994 Russian pledge in the Budapest Memorandum, their earlier dissolution of the USSR that recognized Ukraine's independence, and the provisions of the UN Charter that in theory protect Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity. 

What additional promise could possibly Russia make? What reassurance could those "Nazi" Ukrainians and "expansionist" NATO states eager for the destruction of Holy Mother Russia possibly make that reassures the paranoid Russians? 

And we'll just set aside the result of letting Russia get away with its atrocities inside Ukraine.

Ukraine is in effect defending Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Kazakhstan and the rest of the "Stans," and quite likely Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania from Russia's imperial objectives. Admit it. Putin has more territorial ambitions

And then add in the possible encouragement of China to invade Taiwan if Russia isn't defeated and pushed back. As I've highlighted in Military Review, China doesn't need to conquer Taiwan all at once to win an invasion.

What will the political climate around the world be as Putin argues that Russia is "the strong horse" with the will to resist the West? Plenty of dictators and those who aspire to be dictators would love a victorious Russia's backing, no?

Further, who will be crazy enough to rely on anything but nuclear weapons if facing an aggressive neighbor if Russia is not clearly beaten?

The only path for a lasting peace in Europe goes through the destruction of Russia's ground forces in battle and their retreat:

A successful series of Ukrainian counter-offensives, not just one, is thus almost certainly necessary but not sufficient to persuade Putin to enter negotiations on terms other than the achievement of all of his stated objectives. Ukrainian forces must show that they can do what Russian forces cannot, namely change the realities on the ground through military action. They must further damage Russian military power in Ukraine to the point at which it becomes clear to Putin and the inner circle that supports him in this war that the Russian armed forces cannot hope to improve the outcome of the war by continued fighting.

Right now, that's the Russian "off ramp" from the war they started. Ukraine has a lot riding on their next counteroffensive. And the ones after that, if Putin's determination to fight on isn't a bluff.

I grow weary of Westerners who worry that Russia will be defeated too badly. Will Russia's failed winter offensive in the Donbas inspire more of this impulse? Why give Putin that warm fuzzy feeling that the West will underwrite Russia's war by preventing the worst case for Russia? That encourages Putin to persist and take risks.

Let the Russians be the ones who worry about whether Russia can survive a major defeat. If Russia wants to avoid the defeat of their ground forces, Russia always has an off ramp from this war they started--turning around and leaving Ukraine the way the entered.

And rest assured, if Ukrainians decide that ejecting Russia from every piece of land is not worth the price in their lives, they'll let everyone know. We are not, in fact, fighting Russia to the last Ukrainian. 

UPDATE (Thursday): About my observation that Ukraine has a lot riding on their next counteroffensive with new Western equipment:

If the 2023 counteroffensive fails and those vehicles and troops go to waste, Kyiv might not get another chance to liberate Russian-occupied southern and eastern Ukraine.

And Ukraine needs to do it without the simple Russian-style casualty-intensive and ammunition-intensive attacks. Can Ukraine manage a complicated offensive? 

UPDATE: Is Ukraine willing to negotiate over Crimea's fate under certain circumstances? 

If Russia proves capable of conducting an effective defense to discourage Ukraine from trying to drive all the way to the Kerch Strait despite giving ground all the way to the neck enough, that's possible. 

My view is that unless Ukrainian troops pushing into Crimea are pursuing fleeing Russian troops trying to cross the strait bridge, Ukraine risks keeping their best mobile force tied down in a sideshow, giving Russia an opportunity to launch an offensive in the Donbas. 

I still think there is a potential way around this Crimea roadblock to ending the war in an acceptable fashion for Ukraine

UPDATE (Friday): Ah, Ukraine is willing to get Crimea back by armed or diplomatic means.  

If Ukraine manages to break through Russian defenses and get close to Crimea, unless Ukrainian troops can bounce the isthmus and push in quickly, it may negotiate. 

Russia would have motivation to talk to buy time to restore defenses; and Ukraine would have motivation to talk to reset logistics and troops farther south to resume the offensive.

But neither would believe talking can resolve the issue.

NOTE: ISW coverage of the war continues here.