Russia has unveiled a new, smaller assault unit to replace the failed battalion tactical group (BTG) to sustain attacks in their year-old bloody invasion of Ukraine. This is a sign of leadership weakness.
The Russian BTG, which I long thought was overrated by the panty flingers, failed in Ukraine. Why? In addition to what I highlighted, too much for junior officers to coordinate and command:
There was an important difference between the Western battle groups and the current BTGs. The Western battle groups were kept simple (mainly infantry and tank companies) with the addition of combat engineers or artillery as needed. American infantry officers got lots of realistic training using these battle groups. Western armies had many career NCOs to make sure the troops performed well.
Russia expanded their BTGs after 2000 and added more support units so that each BTG had most of the support capabilities usually found in a division. These support units were smaller in the BTG, often a dozen or so specialists riding in a few trucks.
Add in heavy equipment, troop, and officer losses during the invasion and you have the motivation to create smaller units.
I speculated that Russian losses might make even company-sized attacks beyond their capabilities:
Further, there are reports that the Russians who once could not fight with coordinated battalion tactical groups are sending single companies to attack objectives. ...
Are the Ukrainians feeding minimal units into the east only to keep the Russians from breaking through or making significant advances while bleeding the Russians? Surely, if this continues the Russians will eventually be unable to launch even company-sized ground attacks.
Now Russia has formalized it with "assault detachments" that are in theory battalion task forces. ISW describes the group as having three companies of two small platoons each, plus 4 BMPs, a single main battle tank, and supporting UAVs, heavy machine guns, mortars, artillery, and medical evacuation assets.
Strategypage writes that the assault groups have fewer than 100 personnel with a dozen or so armored fighting vehicles in three small "companies"--company tactical groups (CTGs)? These units are the product of leader losses and poor quality leaders for Russia's smaller units: "As simplified as they are, the key problem is the lack of small unit officers in general and combat experienced officers in particular."
I'm assuming Strategypage's number of 100 refers to a CTG's strength and not the assault detachment that commands three CTGs, with 300 or so. Which is much smaller than a BTG that might have 800.
The companies attack with the infantry forward and the armor held back for fire support. Clearly the poorly trained infantry is expendable while the armor is prized.
While Russia can send these units into battle, they quickly run out of steam (culminate) before achieving more than nominal advances.
To me the Russians are treating the CTGs as rounds of ammunition to be expended. Organize them, send them into battle to die, and refill the unit with more cannon fodder but hopefully few equipment replacements because the armored vehicles are held back from the line of contact.
This is a far cry from the Cold War when the Russians intended to expend their divisions that way to overwhelm the superior but outnumbered NATO divisions in West Germany in a short war where rebuilding divisions would take too long.
This speaks poorly of the Russian leadership quality, basically. Russia experienced this before. In World War II after the actual Nazi invasion destroyed the large Russian divisions in the initial 1941 invasion campaign, the Russians had to adapt to heavy officer losses (exacerbated by pre-war purges) even as it mobilized more men and produced more tanks and heavy equipment.
As Russia rebuilt its army it shrunk their units to lessen the stress on newly trained officers. For example, if memory serves me, Russia created tank battalions of 21 tanks--two companies of ten tanks each plus a tank in the battalion headquarters unit. Brigades of three battalions would have 63+ tanks, adding in a brigade headquarters element. These battalions were not much larger than Western or German companies (up to 17 tanks); while the brigades were not much larger than Western or German battalions/regiments of over 50 tanks.
Despite grand plans for new divisions, Russia has fallen back on their World War II experience to cope with today's problems. So until Russia can train new combat leaders and give them experience commanding larger units, Russia's offensives are loud but shallow.
Still, I wonder if Russia is building a larger reserve that we don't see. You'd think satellites and other means would make that impossible. But Russia is vast if nothing else. I don't want to underestimate the Russians. Of course, I think Ukraine has a lot held back as it forms new units. We'll see.
In additional BTG news, it appears that the Chinese are making even more complex BTGs. Winning.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
