Be careful about learning lessons from local wars and applying them to great power wars.
Azerbaijan successfully leveraged emerging technology to create a near-transparent battlefield that exposed Armenian armored vehicles like T-72 and T-80 tanks, even in defensive or built-up positions. The exploitation that followed with armed drones and exquisite Israeli-made HARPY loitering munitions highlighted the vulnerability of maneuver forces and how effectively modern fires capabilities can shape the battlefield. Overall, these advancements in fires technology—both to sense and destroy targets—put into question the survivability of military vehicles, and thus the viability of most maneuver warfare means on a modern battlefield, regardless of whether they are armored.
And I mentioned the broader issue of operations as well as the issue of main battle tanks--or their replacements--surviving on the battlefield (but don't assume, as I explored on the USNI Blog, infantry as we know it can survive that combination of precision and persistent surveillance) to enable maneuver.
But while the Azerbaijan War with Armenia should be examined for lessons of how weapons work, there are countermeasures that might degrade that stunning Azerbaijani drone success.
Perhaps heavy use of smoke screens will help.
And more decoys.
And electronic and visual signature (both eyeball and heat sensing) reduction for vehicles.
And active protection systems for vehicles.
And exploiting weather that degrades the drone threat for your own operations.
And area electronic warfare bubbles that degrade or destroy enemy drones.
And friendly combat air patrol drones (which I suggested in Army magazine).
And more physical obstacles to contain enemy abilities to exploit successes.
And an emphasis on frequent repositioning for armored vehicles rather than dug-in positions.
And networked dispersal of armored vehicles for dispersed massing of effort until offensive or defensive missions require the AFVs to physically mass for the battle.
And extra emphasis on attacking drone bases.
And replacement of manned AFVs with robotic or remotely controlled AFVs (even in part, as I proposed in Infantry magazine) to reduce casualties.
And roving flak traps to discourage drone use.
And plenty more that I have neither the professional military education nor imagination to think of.
And yes the Winter War of 2022 which looks like a war between peer militaries has lessons--but be careful about what lessons are learned (returning to the initial article):
Additionally, it is incumbent upon military professionals to determine how much of the observed phenomena is the result of poor Russian leadership, crew proficiency, or tactics, techniques, and procedures.
The decisive and fast-moving Balkan wars on the eve of World War I in no way called into question the assumption that maneuver warfare was still alive and well, reinforcing European views built on late 19th century brief wars in Europe. The Western and Italian fronts looked nothing like expectations.
So yeah, that Caucasus war should be studied. But minor state wars are not fully transferable on lessons to great power wars. And even the next war between Armenia and Azerbaijan may see Armenia learn and employ counter-measures that degrade or nullify Azerbaijan's recent innovations.
NOTE: Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
