How can Taiwan defeat a Chinese invasion?
I think China can invade Taiwan (don't discount the large Chinese coast guard's potential role), with the objective of quickly seizing the capital in the north. The Pescadores Islands would be captured to knock out Taiwanese threats to ships and planes in the Taiwan Strait, provide advanced bases for fire support and logistics, and freeze Taiwanese troops in the south.
Chinese air and naval assets would attempt to defend lines of supply across the Taiwan Strait and interdict enemy attempts to reinforce the Taiwanese and supply Taiwanese and allied forces on Taiwan.
While the U.S. and Taiwan prevail in most scenarios, there are some conditions for success, according to CSIS, including that Taiwan must hold the line and that U.S. forces must have access to bases in Japan.
These are the victory conditions from the CSIS full report:
The outcome of each iteration was scored as follows:
1. Chinese Victory: Chinese ground forces outnumber Taiwanese forces on the island. Once that happens, and the Chinese control enough airports and ports to bring the bulk of their ground forces over, they will eventually prevail, though the complete conquest of an island the size of Taiwan would take many months, barring a capitulation. Two iterations continued until total conquest; most iterations were ended when Chinese victory appeared inevitable.
2. Stalemate: Chinese forces have a significant lodgment ashore, and neither side can make rapid gains. Chinese forces have captured a handful of ports and airports. The United States is striking those facilities to make or keep them fully unusable, while China is attempting to repair them and make them fully functional. This outcome typically occurred when China was able to secure the southern part of the island and the facilities there.
a. Stalemate, trending toward China: China has a solid beachhead that is not in danger of being eliminated. They have more than three ports or airports on Taiwan, although these may be damaged. To defeat the invasion, the United States and its allies would have to keep these ports and airports suppressed, resupply Taiwan, and, possibly, commit ground forces to rescue the Taiwanese position. China would have to clear ports or airports with the engineers landed, possibly while under attack.
b. Stalemate, indeterminate: An ambiguous situation, often involving the loss of the entire Chinese amphibious fleet, but with Chinese forces securely ashore and having occupied several damaged port or airport facilities. Resolution depends on whether China can restore the captured facilities to supply and expand its forces before Taiwanese forces counterattack in strength. The campaign would take an extended period.
c. Stalemate, trending against China: Although the Chinese have a significant beachhead, they do not possess a favorable enough force ratio to make quick gains against opposing Taiwanese ground forces. The Chinese amphibious fleet has suffered high attrition, and they have no working ports and airports on Taiwan. China is trying to substitute small civilian craft for the large amphibious carriers that it has lost, but as the British found at Gallipoli, this results in a dramatically lower supply throughput. An important question on the Taiwan side would include the state of its ammunition stocks and the ability to resupply. Whatever the eventual outcome, it is not where the Chinese would want to be.
3. Chinese Defeat: The Chinese amphibious fleet is mostly destroyed, and the Chinese have not taken sufficient ports or airports such that major landing operations can continue. Relatively small Chinese forces are confined to a small landing area, and they are only receiving small amounts of supplies from airdrops and small civilian boats. At this point, it would be a matter of time for the Taiwanese forces to mop up Chinese survivors. The main challenge for the United States would not be in eliminating the remaining invaders but finding an acceptable offramp for hostilities.
I know I always say check the definitions. Boy is that important, eh?
As I noted in that post of mine cited initially, which addressed initial reports of the CSIS simulations, China's definition of winning may be different than our definition. I argued that position in Military Review.
Basically, if CSIS can project a Chinese victory months after the simulation ends in the "Chinese victory" measure, you have to speculate about years after the simulation ends.
In any of the stalemate scenarios, I believe the result should be coded as a Chinese victory. Given the high American casualties predicted, raise your hand if you think America will support a fight to drive the nuclear-armed Chinese into the sea--even in the "stalemate, trending against China" measure--when Taiwan continuing as a political entity in the short run can be defined as victory. Or at least defined as not a defeat.
I think China holding a significant bridgehead regardless of the trend signifies a Chinese victory. Eventually a ceasefire will take hold, whether or not it is official. And then China will build up its forces on Taiwan for months or years until it can resume the invasion. Or until the threat of a resumed overland invasion undermines Taiwan's resolve to resist their giant neighbor.
Holding the line on Taiwan isn't enough. Stalemate with the PLA on Taiwan means delayed defeat for Taiwan. Our planning and simulations must be conducted with that assumption. Taiwan and its allies--including American heavy forces if we can establish secure logistics to the island--must drive the Chinese into the sea before China can be called defeated. "Porcupine" weapons won't do the job. Taiwan needs tanks, attack helicopters, and artillery to drive the PLA into the sea.
UPDATE: Deterring or defeating China's invasion of Taiwan are good objectives. A great objective is making Taiwan a lower Chinese priority.
NOTE: Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
