Western analysts did not appreciate Ukrainian strengths and Russian weaknesses. But will Russia demonstrate that quantity with just enough quality is sufficient to win the Winter War of 2022?
The Russians have morale and logistics problems. But Ukraine has to attack them seriously to exploit that. The war is mostly stalemated with Ukraine still having the edge in initiative. Russia attacks on the Donetsk front, grinding forward very slowly but with high losses. Ukraine has the initiative southeast of Kharkov and on the Kherson front, but I don't see much in the way of breaking the Russians or taking territory. I worry that Ukraine can't afford to let this stalemate drag on without risking defeat.
I knew Russia's military couldn't just push Ukraine over:
Russian troops could probably plow their way to the Dnieper River line. But how many dead Russians can Putin endure to do that?
I think the scope of a large invasion from Kiev to the Black Sea is too much for Russia to sustain for long. Putting 100 battalion tactical groups into an invasion must surely hollow out every combat brigade across all of Russia. Those BTGs are a means of scraping something out of less-than-adequate brigades. And I suspect a large fraction of those 100 aren't very good given the state of the Russian army. How many ill-trained conscripts were needed to fill out that number of units?
Here's a good explanation of Russia's situation against Ukraine. How long does Russia think it can afford to fight in Ukraine against surviving Ukrainian army units on the other side of the Dnieper River? With insurgents and irregulars tormenting second-rate Russian occupying troops? With Ukraine getting and using longer range missiles to bombard Russia's bases in Crimea? Without tempting Russia's enemies around their long border to take advantage in some way? Without breaking Russian logistics? Without crippling Russia's economy? Without inspiring public resistance to excessive Russian casualties?Will the body bags going back to Russia stop when Russia declares victory?
So I had that going for me. But part of this critique of Western analysts failing to understand Russia's military weakness and Ukrainian strengths (do read it all) falls on me, too:
Many in the West mistakenly thought Ukraine was just like Russia, but weaker, more corrupt, and chaotic. In fact, while Ukraine is by no means perfect, it is more agile and decentralized, compared to the autocratic and rigid Russian state.
I worried a lot that corruption would prove fatal to Ukraine in the long run given its smaller size compared to corrupt Russia. I didn't appreciate fully the the centralized autocratic versus democratic decentralization angle that seems to have made the difference (enabled by robust Western support, of course).
Of course, my
assessment might still be right because Putin didn't wait for the long
run and instead chose to go big right now militarily. And without
Western support, Ukraine might have done about as well as I
anticipated--if Russia hadn't initially tried to stage military parades
into Ukraine instead of leading with massive firepower. Which decimated the Russian army and alerted Ukraine, making it harder for Russia when it switched to firepower.
Hell, if Ukraine can't press its hard-won advantage in the next few months to compel Russia to retreat from Ukraine, I don't rule out that Russia might eventually mobilize enough to achieve what I projected in that pre-war assessment.
Remember that I chose my term for the war because I worried that the template might be the Winter War of 1939-1940, when Finland initially humbled the Soviet military but in the end was ground down by the Soviets who regrouped and battered Finland down with firepower and troops, albeit while enduring heavy Soviet casualties.
I worry that even if Russia can't fix their problems during this war that they will in the future. So this question is timely: Can Russia learn from its evident shortcomings inside Ukraine (and presumably after losing the war in its entirety)?
Should the Russian military learn from its mistakes, it would be a fatal error for the West to miss this transformation and assume we are engaging the same enemy they’ve faced off against for the last 80 years. However unlikely, transformation is possible, and we must be vigilant to watch for it.
Heartily endorsed.
But I digress--if only in time frame.
Russia is taking far longer than three months to repeat that 1940 Soviet win. And a far weaker Russia may not be able to do so if the West remains united behind arming and sustaining Ukraine. And can Russia sustain its effort that may look to resume offensive operations after the spring 2023 mud dries up which coincides with the completion of an initial training cycle of the current conscription class?
Yet there is a real chance Russia's ground forces will break under the strain before then, and suffer the fate of the Italian 10th Army that invaded British-owned Egypt in 1940. Despite apparent Russian worries that they can't hold Kherson city, the Russians apparently changed their mind about pulling troops from the west bank of the Dnieper River in Kherson province. They seem to have put their best troops on that front (according to the Ukrainians). Does this give Ukraine the opportunity to drop all the bridges and sink all the ferries along the river while striking south from Zaporizhzhya to Melitipol with the main effort, potentially bagging Russia's best troops defending Kherson? But I'm speculating. And to be honest, hoping.
The longer the war goes on the more chance Russia has to repeat that ugly 1940 victory over Finland by stomping on smaller Ukraine, no matter how clumsy Russia looks doing so and even if it takes a few years. Or is that optimistic? As I've noted, the war has gone on for more than 8 months. Has Russia created new units in this time?
If so, where are they? Might the Russians sent to Belarus be the vanguard of that force that will strike western Ukraine or make another attempt to take Kiev? Or have the Russians had to use their spring conscripts to replace losses? And are the Russians in Belarus just there training or a "payment" to Belarus to make up for Belarus weapons sent to Russia to replace losses?
I just don't see enough information to ease my nagging worry. I'm mostly sure I'm worried for nothing.
Mostly.
Have a super sparkly day.
UPDATE: Ukraine's apparent aerial and surface drone attack on Russia's Crimea naval base. Results are unclear. A lot is unclear given Russia used the attack as excuse to end grain export deal.
What is going on? First the withdrawal seems on. Then it seemed Putin reversed the order. Now the retreat is on again? Is there indecision on what to do?
Is Russia simply trying to keep the Ukrainians guessing to shield the withdrawal by making Ukrainian pursuit cautious?
Or could Russia be planning to hold a bridgehead at Kherson city only? This would preserve a bridgehead to one day resume an advance on Odessa while allowing other Russians to defend the river line closer to more secure supply sources.
UPDATE (Tuesday): Russia's food blockade is challenged:
Ships loaded with grain departed Ukraine on Tuesday despite Russia suspending its participation in a U.N.-brokered deal that ensures safe wartime passage of critical food supplies meant for parts of the world struggling with hunger.
Will Russia dare try to sink the food ships?
UPDATE: Russia won't have to challenge the ships. The United Nations preemptively retreated:
The United Nations called a halt to grain ships moving through Ukraine’s crop-export corridor in the Black Sea after Russia warned that vessels weren’t safe using the route.
Sadly predictable, I suppose. [LATER: Russia rejoined the food export deal. But we'll see what they do when if formally expires.]
UPDATE: ISW looks at Ukrainian partisans:
Effective Ukrainian partisan attacks are forcing the Kremlin to divert resources away from frontline operations to help secure rear areas, degrading Russia’s ability to defend against ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensives, let alone conduct their own offensive operations. Poor Russian operational security has enabled Ukrainian partisan attacks.
How much of that activity is from special forces and irregular infiltrators?
UPDATE (Friday): There are conflicting signals about whether Russia will withdraw from Kherson city or fight west of the Dnieper River. ISW says that watching the airborne units west of the river is probably the key sign. If they stay, Russia fights. If they pull out, Russia is abandoning the west bank.
Still, I wonder if the outcome will be a compromise between Russians who want to bug out and those who want to stay. What if Russia holds a defensive line around the city of Kherson only? This would allow the Russians to maintain a bridgehead on the west side of the Dnieper River to one day resume the offensive to Odessa? Russia could withdraw from the rest of the west bank so they'll have a river line to defend plus a city--which the Ukrainians have shown can be defended.
UPDATE: Russia is losing its war with Ukraine. And can't find a solution.
But despite all the media talk of Ukraine's counter-offensive there is little to show for it since two large chunk gains in Kharkov province and then Kherson province. And neither of those seemed to capture a lot of Russians to make the victories strategically significant on the battlefield.
Will Ukraine launch a big offensive this year? Can they? Size doesn't guarantee a Russian victory. Russia's army could crack. But if Ukraine can't hit the Russians hard to shatter that morale, Russia could yet exploit its size to regain the advantage. At a high cost. But a battlefield win of some sort, nonetheless.
UPDATE: Hmmm:
Ukrainian forces can retake the strategic southern city of Kherson from Russian troops, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said on Thursday, in what would be a major defeat for Russia in its invasion of its neighbor.
Yes, it would be a major defeat. But "can" is not "will." Can Ukraine retake Melitopol?
UPDATE: Conflicting Russian signals might be as simple as trying to make Ukraine too cautious to pursue a withdrawing Russian army and allow the Russians to get across to the east bank safely.
UPDATE: New American aid package, including money to refurbish stored U.S. Hawk air defense missiles and to refurbish 45 Czech T-72Bs for Ukraine. And 40 river patrol boats. I assume they come in handy on that really wide lake-like stretch of the Dnieper River that is the front line in the south. Is the money for refurbishing M1117 armored cars for additional vehicles or to fix up vehicles Ukraine already has? [UPDATE: From DOD press conference, for new M117s.]
UPDATE (Saturday): I'd noticed that Russia seems more active on the Donbas front. ISW writes that the Russians are likely to use their mobilized reservists to renew their offensive on the Donetsk sector. But they are unlikely to gain "operationally significant" ground.
In addition, ISW thinks Russia is preparing a fighting withdrawal to evacuate the west bank of the Dnieper River in Kherson province.
UPDATE: I've heard rumors:
The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 4 that Russian forces in Ukraine probably have started deploying “barrier troops” and “blocking units”, units that threaten to shoot their own retreating personnel to compel offensives.
But is Russia using these barrier troops to shoot rather than round up deserters?
UPDATE: I almost wondered if all those armored riverine patrol boats we are providing could be used for building drone attack vessels as Ukraine used to attack Sevastopol. A recent DOD press conference had a question and answer that might have implied that is the case. But that just could be me looking to confirm my vague suspicion.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here.
