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Monday, October 03, 2022

The Winter War of 2022 Gets Old

Apparently when you need to crush NATO-armed Nazis, only the Russians who retired are up to the job.

By going right to the bottom of the barrel to replace his ground forces' heavy losses, Putin telegraphs he doesn't expect these newly recalled reservists to survive his crusade against so-called Nazis.

But what will he do with them?  

Will Putin's plan be to endure Ukrainian counterattacks until winter saves his front? And then use his mobilized forces to defend what he still controls inside Ukraine? Maybe. It makes sense. 

But can Russia's ground forces hold the line through the winter? How well equipped and supplied will they be to survive in the winter, let alone fight? I've mentioned many times that armies that endure defeat can break. Will Russia's ground forces hold until spring?

One of the most important aspects of Putin’s decree last week was to extend indefinitely the temporary contracts of those at the front, including many soldiers who had been expecting to leave as their short-term contract expired, and were looking forward to their back pay. Having already been through a gruelling time, seeing many of their comrades die and be wounded, they can no longer expect early release or the pay-offs they were promised. They can only look forward to more of the same, except in colder weather. They are being joined by fearful men – just pressed into service, with little to offer and much to lose – who will be thrown into battle against determined Ukrainian forces. If this continues to go badly it will add to the demoralisation and ill-discipline at the front, leading to desertion, surrender or even mutiny.

Add in a feeling of despair at being abandoned by their leadership that doesn't care if they live or die (what else can they assume after getting old weapons and little training?), or even have food and supplies to survive in their trench, and the odds of breaking rise.

And does that possible plan to hold on to his gains make sense from Putin's point of view? Is Putin willing to admit he won't conquer Ukraine? I have no idea if he can admit that. Especially after terrifying his civilian world to mobilize hundreds of thousands of men. Usually when you increase your commitment of resources you feel pressure to increase your objectives to make them worthy of the higher commitment. The whole "we're fighting for our survival against Nazis and NATO" rhetoric puts heavy Russian sacrifices in a different light, eh? If the Russians who do the dying go along, of course.

A week ago I read this:

President Vladimir Putin of Russia has thrust himself more directly into strategic planning for the war in Ukraine in recent weeks, American officials said, including rejecting requests from his commanders on the ground that they be allowed to retreat from the vital southern city of Kherson.

If Putin only wants to hold ground, pulling back to the Dniepr River makes more sense. If Putin still has dreams of taking Odessa and linking up with Transnistria, holding territory west of the river makes sense.

I don't know if Putin is willing to risk scaling back his ambitions given the rhetoric while he still has troops to command.

And if the excuse for Russia's failures thus far have been firmly placed on the senior military leadership--regardless of the truth--then a simple solution is to put Putin in charge, at long last!

Perhaps Putin plans to organize his new masses into grandly named "Guards" or "Shock" units--Hell, issue them whatever Armata tanks can be pushed into motion--with little training, and fling them back across the now-dormant northeastern front where few Ukrainian troops are stationed since Russia's drive on Kiev failed. 

With an influx of North Korean artillery ammunition, Putin may believe he will finally achieve on a larger scale what Russia achieved in the Donbas--grinding forward behind artillery barrages. He may believe his newly raised legions will do what late-arriving Soviet Far East reserves did in 1941 to save Moscow and break Hitler's ability to win the war.

If so, a lot is riding on the lives of hundreds of thousands of poorly trained, equipped, and led Russian cannon fodder.

UPDATE: ISW: Maximalist advocacy by milbloggers for military offensives and mobilization are setting standards that Russia cannot meet. And calls by a Chechen leader for nukes after losing Lyman hurt Russian efforts to minimize the defeat. 

On the ground, Ukraine has taken ground on the northeast Kherson front while continuing to move forward in the east. Russia continues to attack on the Donetsk front.

UPDATE: Is Ukraine's advance in Kherson larger than I have assumed? And yeah, I've been discussing for many months the possibility that Russian casualties and morale could lead to a collapse of the ground forces on some section of the front. 

UPDATE: TDI doesn't think Russia lost many troops in their withdrawal from Lyman.

UPDATE: Getting the Russians retreating is important. Just two weeks ago I advised that Ukraine couldn't win the war without pushing the Russians back. Get the Russians running and they may break. Let them sit in their trenches and they may stay there no matter how bad their morale is.

UPDATE: From ISW

Ukrainian forces have made substantial gains around Lyman and in northern Kherson Oblast over the last 24 hours. The Russian units defeated on these fronts were previously considered to be among Russia’s premier conventional fighting forces.

Huh.

In addition, confusion over annexed provincial boundaries seems to indicate that Russia cannot simply go over to the defensive; and must attack to capture the claimed territory that Ukraine holds.

UPDATE (Tuesday): I heard on DW News that winter clothing is being rushed to Ukraine for their troops.

UPDATE (Wednesday): From the latest ISW update:

Ukrainian forces continued to make significant gains in Kherson Oblast while simultaneously continuing advances in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts on October 4. Ukrainian forces liberated several settlements on the eastern bank of the Inhulets River along the T2207 highway, forcing Russian forces to retreat to the south toward Kherson City. Ukrainian forces also continued to push south along the Dnipro River and the T0403 highway, severing two Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in northern Kherson Oblast and forcing Russians south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border toward the Beryslav area.

Can Ukraine maintain the momentum? Will there be a big skedaddle as Russian forces race each other for the last ferry ride across the Dniepr (Dnipro) River?

UPDATE (Thursday): Russia no longer has all of Ukraine's Luhansk province

UPDATE: Is Crimea within reach of Ukraine's army?

UPDATE (Saturday): There was an explosion on Russia's Kerch Strait bridge that damaged a traffic span. It is unknown if it was an attack or an accident. If we see another explosion we've reached the "coincidence" stage. If that link is cut, Russia will have more problems supplying Crimea and their southern front. If Ukraine takes Melitopol, Russia's situation really gets bad. 

NOTE: ISW updates continue here.