Is the Marine Corps strategy of deploying anti-ship teams to changing positions around the Western Pacific the key to keeping China from invading Taiwan? We may just be entering a Chinese SINKEX.
Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger believes that the threat of having Marines leapfrogging from island to island plinking at Chinese warships in the South China Sea with anti-ship missiles will either deter China from starting a war or will be decisive in winning it.
He is wrong.
China's warships are a very expendable part of its overall strategy. The Chinese believe their mobile missile launchers, high endurance drones, reconnaissance satellites and swarms of attack aircraft, combined with attack submarines, would be sufficient to create a bubble that would prevent Americans from interfering with an invasion of Taiwan.
I have a strong suspicion that the author is correct.
The "bubble" is the key. As I've long argued, China doesn't need to defeat America to defeat Taiwan. China needs to delay America long enough to defeat Taiwan:
As I've droned on repeatedly here, China does not need to defeat America to conquer Taiwan. China needs to defeat Taiwan to conquer Taiwan. And to defeat Taiwan, China only needs to delay our intervention long enough to defeat and conquer Taiwan. This is a far less difficult mission than deterring America or defeating us.
If the US intervenes, the Chinese will use whatever anti-satellite weapons they have and will try to slow down the US by threatening us with attack. I think they will refrain from striking first but will put forces in positions that will be threatening to us if left alone. The time it will take for the US to decide to engage Chinese PLAN forces will be valuable. The Chinese will sacrifice their fleet to take Taiwan, if necessary. They think long-term, remember? So what if they need another twenty years to rebuild what we sink?
I called it a Chinese SINKEX playing on Navy history that seeks World War II Pacific glory:
The Chinese aircraft carrier would have a role in slowing down our intervention, too. China's first carrier was for studying and training. China's true carriers will be Chinese designed vessels. Those China probably wouldn't risk. But the old Varyag? If I was in charge of the PLAN (People's Liberation Army Navy), I'd dangle that carrier and some escorts northeast of Taiwan. As I noted, its presence would give us pause. And force us to approach more cautiously.
The final contribution of that first Chinese carrier to delaying our intervention could be to tempt us into taking the time to set up and execute the perfect naval strike mission. Sure, having sovereign pieces of US territory that serve as power projection assets is useful. And the Navy trumpets that mission in budget battles. But the Navy--deep down--wants to exercise sea control and take down another navy that tries to wrest it from us. It would be the best SINKEX, ever.
Adding Marine quills to a Taiwanese "porcupine" strategy may simply add to the price China pays to win. Don't pretend we know how much pain an enemy will endure to win.
Without a doubt, Ukraine's anti-tank "quills" have inflicted a heavy price on Russia's armored vehicle force. But more than six months later, Russia is still holding a lot more territory than it had at the start of the war. I refuse to worship at the altar of asymmetry.
And it gets worse for Taiwan. To defeat Taiwan, unlike my earlier assumption, Taiwan doesn't even need to conquer Taiwan. As time has gone on, I started to examine my assumption. As I argued in Military Review, the PLA just needs to get ashore and hold on until it gets a ceasefire.
Analysis of the Russian invasion that notes even with a ceasefire Russia will hold a lot of crucial territory reinforces my changing view. Ukraine will be in a difficult position unless it drives back Russian forces at least from the critical southern front along the Black Sea coast.
Again, before we decide we can defeat China in a war over Taiwan, we need to understand what China considers a victory.
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