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Monday, February 17, 2014

The Distance of Tyranny

When we speak of reacting to threats, we often speak of the "tyranny of distance." That is, from our Western Hemisphere location, we have to go long ways to reach any theater. That imposes limits that simply can't be avoided. The flip side for some of our friends is the "distance of tyranny." That is, how close are threats to them? Taiwan is a good example.

Strategypage writes that China's navy isn't about to gain the ability to take away our dominance of the western Pacific:

Fears that the Chinese Navy are a threat to 70 years of American naval dominance in the Pacific are premature. While the Chinese have come a long way since the 1970s, when the fleet largely consisted of lots of coastal patrol boats and some larger World War II era warships the Chinese still do not have a very effective high seas force.

One thing is undeniable; they are making progress.

And when they write that just our Pacific fleet is larger, I have to assume they mean by tonnage and not by numbers.

But in numbers, we have surely lost ground.

In 2012 (I'm looking at an article in the September 2013 Naval Institute Proceedings), we are credited with 283 battle force ships (that includes our amphibious warfare ships) while China's navy is credited with 243 by the same measure. Of those totals we have 100 major surface combatants while China is credited with 79. Our 54 nuclear attack submarines outclass their 5 SSNs. But China has 58 other submarines, mostly non-nuclear attack boats. We have 18 more, of which 4 are the large cruise missile subs and the rest strategic nuclear subs not weighing in on the naval balance. And obviously we're 11 to 1 in aircraft carriers (and China's is way less capable and will be even when trained up to standards), not counting some of our amphibious warfare ships as mini-carriers when not carrying Marines.

If you assume 60% of our fleet is Pacific based and that we don't shrink the fleet, we have fewer ships. And ours are spread from the South China Sea to San Diego.

And don't forget land-based air power. China is a giant aircraft carrier in its own right.

I'll not doubt that in training and technology, we are ahead.

On the other hand, we have allies such as Japan and South Korea nearby, with formidable navies. Local navies would soak up some of China's power. Even Taiwan's navy isn't too shabby. And allies further afield, such as India and Australia, could influence the fight.

So I have to say I admit that China is not about to take away our dominance of the Western Pacific.

But that is irrelevant to the problem at hand. If China strikes first, they will mass a majority of their fleet against a minority of our fleet and possibly sink or damage a good portion of it.

Sure, given time to mass our Pacific fleet, move ships from other areas into the region, coordinate and bring in allies, and move in air power to land bases, we can reestablish our dominance of the western Pacific.

Yet the tyranny of distance, as we call it, means that most of our power is far away. There is only so much we can do to escape the math of how long it takes to send more power to the western Pacific.

So what does China do while they temporarily have dominance in the western Pacific?

That's the problem. We are infinitely more powerful than al Qaeda-inspired jihadis. But at Benghazi on September 11, 2012, all al Qaeda had to be stronger than was the local defense forces at or near or diplomatic facilities. Eventually, we could dominate the region. But while it mattered, jihadis dominated the area, sacked our diplomatic facility and killed four Americans.

China could do the same in the gap between when China lunges at us and when we reestablish our dominance in the western Pacific (and this assumes China doesn't have too many unpleasant surprises for us and assumes we seek to reestablish that superiority by waging war).

And what might China do? Well, we figure China's military is focused on Taiwan, as I explain:

This is important to remember when you hear people say our military is far more powerful than China's and that China has weaknesses in training and doctrine that make them less than their hardware makes it appear. These are true statements yet irrelevant to China's most critical potential mission.

China just needs to defeat Taiwan to carry out their most critical potential mission. China needs only to deny effective American intervention until China can defeat Taiwan. That's something altogether different from needing to defeat us, isn't it? Just in case you missed the importance of that distinction, the report repeats that truth a bit later on[.]

Taiwan is very close to China and very far from America. Our problem in meeting this threat is the tyranny of distance that slows us down.

Remember, China wants to absorb Taiwan and needs to defeat Taiwan--not defeat America.

Defeating Taiwan requires China to deter or delay effective American intervention long enough for China to defeat Taiwan.

Will China really assume we would act promptly? Or will Peking's rulers believe we will justify inaction by pointing to some Internet video that "provoked" China's invasion?

Taiwan's problem is that a tyranny that wants to control them is very close, just 100 miles across the Taiwan Strait.

Yet this body of water gives Taiwan the opportunity to preserve their democracy by defeating such an attempt or making the price China would pay to win too high for the rulers to survive post-war anger after the guns fall silent.

Ask Ukrainians what it is like to have a long land border with a tyranny that considers your land their land. What would Ukrainians give to have that kind of barrier right now?

Taiwan needs to have a little more sense of urgency about coping with the distance of tyranny. Otherwise, this scenario will play out in real life.