But have no doubt that the spin on this is hiding important issues. Our leadership tells us that we will retain the ability to fight across the combat spectrum and that we will continue to be able to fight more than one conflict as we always have. These are misleading. The conflict spectrum simply means the types of conflicts we'd have to fight, from peacekeeping in a benign environment to training allied forces to fight insurgents to small scale conventional operations and then all the way up to global thermonuclear war.
First, Britain has the ability to fight along the entire conflict spectrum. Heck, France has that capability. They just do it with a lot fewer forces. So saying we retain that capability is a pretty low bar.
Second, insisting that we retain the ability to fight more than one war at a time ignores that we are clearly redefining "war." In the past, we defined that as the ability to fight more than one ground war at a time. We haven't had that ability over the last couple decades, of course. But that was our goal. Now we say we could fight multiple wars as long as our enemies cooperate by flinging ground forces at us in one theater and naval forces in another--and if they are bold they will add in an insurgency against a capable ally who only needs critical enablers from us to win. Voila! Three wars at once.
But we have clearly decided that we don't need ground forces to fight and win in two wars. Let's check this out from Ashton Carter of DOD:
Next, while our forces will still be capable of prevailing in more than one conflict at the same time -- and I want to make clear that this is not changing -- we are continuing to evolve our approach to this capability, since the nature of those conflicts has changed, since we will be able to apply to them advanced and agile new kinds of forces, and since in some cases we can best meet our objectives and deny the aggressors' objectives in ways other than by land invasion and occupation.
He can say this is not changing, but it is. We are reducing ground forces for a two-ground war goal that we never had. Obviously our ground capabilities are being reduced. Obviously, we are approaching the issue of whether we can win even a single ground war that is more difficult than we hope.
But not to worry, we'll use new, advanced, and agile kinds of forces to deny an aggressor their objective. And we assume we know what our enemy's objective will be. Let's look at the big picture strategic guidance document now:
Deter and Defeat Aggression. U.S. forces will be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by any potential adversary. Credible deterrence results from both the capabilities to deny an aggressor the prospect of achieving his objectives and from the complementary capability to impose unacceptable costs on the aggressor. As a nation with important interests in multiple regions, our forces must be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by an opportunistic adversary in one region even when our forces are committed to a large-scale operation elsewhere. Our planning envisages forces that are able to fully deny a capable state’’s aggressive objectives in one region by conducting a combined arms campaign across all domains –– land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace. This includes being able to secure territory and populations and facilitate a transition to stable governance on a small scale for a limited period using standing forces and, if necessary, for an extended period with mobilized forces. Even when U.S. forces are committed to a large-scale operation in one region, they will be capable of denying the objectives of –– or imposing unacceptable costs on –– an opportunistic aggressor in a second region. U.S. forces will plan to operate whenever possible with allied and coalition forces. Our ground forces will be responsive and capitalize on balanced lift, presence, and prepositioning to maintain the agility needed to remain prepared for the several areas in which such conflicts could occur.
We'll rely on reserves after the active forces do what they can over a limited time to buy time. That's fair enough alone. That's why we have reserves. But it is clear that we don't think the active forces are enough.
Further, it disturbs me that we still think we can prevail in two conflicts at once if a second enemy pounces on the ground while we are involved in one ground war by assuming we will know what objective the enemy will have (might they not attempt a smaller objective knowing we are too busy just to deny them a small victory in a quick strike?) or that we think we know what an unacceptable cost will be for our enemy. All we are doing is trying to reassure the public that we really aren't losing capabilities that count--and we are.
Secretary of Defense Panetta makes it clear that we don't have a two-ground war goal:
The nature of warfare today is that as you -- as you engage, you have to look at how you do it, what forces do you use to be able to confront that enemy, what exactly is involved. I mean, the reality is you could face a land war in Korea, and at the same time face threats in the Straits of Hormuz. We have the capability, with this Joint Force, to deal with those kinds of threats, to be able to confront them, and to be able to win. That's what counts.
But he minimizes this assumption by insisting we can do it all:
The United States military -- let me be very clear about this -- the United States military will remain capable across the spectrum. We will continue to conduct a complex set of missions ranging from counterterrorism, ranging from countering weapons of mass destruction, to maintaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent. We will be fully prepared to protect our interests, defend our homeland and support civil authorities.
Our goal to achieve the U.S. force for the future involves the following significant changes. First, the U.S. joint force will be smaller, and it will be leaner. But its great strength will be that it will be more agile, more flexible, ready to deploy quickly, innovative, and technologically advanced. That is the force for the future.
Clear if you translate. Again, he boasts of retaining something that our military should obviously be capable of--fighting across the conflict spectrum. And our force will be smaller. "Leaner" is just one of those words you use to imply that being smaller is actually better. Which it is if the price of being bigger is being less well equipped and trained, but that is a choice our leaders are making. They could have chosen to be big enough and capable. They are not and are defending their choice by implying it could be worse. It may yet.
Finally, we'll bring troops deployed overseas back home where they will spring overseas with lighter but advanced equipment in smaller numbers if they are needed. He can say it is "the force for the future," but as a future Secretary of Defense might say when ordered to war, "it will be the force we have and not the force we wish we had."
Right now, he continues, we are wishing we will not need ground forces that we found we needed the last decade:
In accordance with this construct, and with the end of U.S. military commitments in Iraq and the drawdown that is already under way in Afghanistan, the Army and Marine Corps will no longer need to be sized to support the kind of large-scale, long-term stability operations that have dominated military priorities and force generation over the past decade.
Perhaps this time we will be right.
Another way we are hiding our ground force decline is by highlighting our shift of emphasis to the Pacific where we anticipate we will need only air and naval forces.
Our military hopes to hedge against the need to fight more than one ground war (or the need to fight a lengthy insurgency that requires troop rotations) by putting capabilities into the reserve forces under the concept of "reversibility." Again, the Secretary of Defense:
And most importantly, we will structure and pace the reductions in the nation's ground forces in such a way that they can surge, regenerate and mobilize capabilities needed for any contingency. Building in reversibility and the ability to quickly mobilize will be key. That means re-examining the mix of elements in the active and Reserve components. It means maintaining a strong National Guard and Reserve. It means retaining a healthy cadre of experienced NCOs and mid-grade officers and preserving the health and viability of the nation's defense industrial base.
We shall see how long we will keep the reserves an operational reserve for a too-small active force. On the bright side, we are no longer treating the Army National Guard as an irrelevant force. Back in the late 90s I wrote an article in Army magazine (not available online, I'm afraid) arguing for an Army National Guard integrated into our war plans. This is some progress.
But this is being done out of necessity as the Army will take it on the chin. Sure, the Marines will take a hit, too, but they are the Navy's ground force so are still considered relevant in a Pacific strategy. The New York Times has some details of what the big picture means in numbers:
The Army is already is slated to drop to a force of 520,000 from 570,000, but Mr. Panetta views even that reduction as too expensive and unnecessary and has endorsed an Army of 490,000 troops as sufficient, officials said. ...
The size of the Marine Corps is also expected to be reduced, although it would be expected to benefit from a renewed focus on the Asia-Pacific region, with Marines deployed aboard ships as well as at bases west of Hawaii.
Sadly, the Marines survive deeper cuts by avoiding being "just a second Army." Given that the Marines have been the biggest ground ally the Army has had in any war we've fought for the last 60 years (excluding the forces of whatever nation we are helping, of course), the Army is losing the entire Marine Corps despite the relatively small reductions they will face.
The Army's reductions will hurt and will result in a smaller force. The reduction from 570,000 to 520,000 isn't so bad. The Army didn't want the extra troops anyway, figuring we'd win the war in Iraq before they came online and then just risk having a hollow force if we kept them and risk a disrupting downsizing if we get rid of them.
But going to 490,000 is a problem. If I recall correctly, 520,000 is what we needed to fully staff our force structure that we had on September 11, 2001. Perhaps our reorganizations of the last decade that eliminated unneeded types of units in favor of units we needed post-Soviet Union means 490,000 is what we need to maintain the force structure we had before the last addition to 570,000. But even that means we'll lose 6 combat brigades, I assume.
My biggest fear is that even if this reduction in the Army's capabilities is well thought out to minimize disruptions, it is only the first step of reductions. Eventually, we'll reach the stage when we can only pretend we have enough ground forces to win. Let me toss in a Land Warfare Paper, The First Gulf War and the Army's Future (1997) I wrote fifteen years ago about the problem of trying to figure out the minimum ground forces we need to prevail. (Funny enough, while it is not available online, it still sits on a server for my former Internet provider. How long that will last I don't know. AUSA may still have paper copies you can request. Or Amazon has it (well, one right now, anyway). Or just save it now while you can.)
