[The] opposition is demanding that the Republican Guard and Special Forces be absorbed into the army, which would operate under a general loyal to Mohsen (Mohsen himself claims he would step down as part of a deal in which Saleh also resigns, but he would be expected to assume a kingmaker status), that the CSF and CTU paramilitary agencies be stripped of their autonomy and operationally come under the Ministry of Interior and that the newly created NSB come under the PSO. Such changes would be tantamount to unraveling the past decade of U.S. counterterrorism investment in Yemen that was designed explicitly to raise a new generation of security officials who could hold their own against the Islamist-leaning old guard. This is not to say that Mohsen and his allies would completely obstruct U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Many within the old guard, eager for U.S. financial aid and opposed to U.S. unilateral military action in Yemen, are likely to veer toward pragmatism in dealing with Washington. That said, Mohsen’s reputation for protecting jihadists operating in Yemen and his poor standing with Washington would add much distrust to an already complicated U.S.-Yemeni relationship.
The problem is that in the short run, efforts by a new government in Yemen to fight al Qaeda will falter whether by design or effect. How many Westerners will die because of the gap in pursuing al Qaeda?
The additional problem is that we don't have a lot of means to influence either the struggle for power or the period of danger within Yemen. So somehow we have to find some way to cope with the gap in effective cooperation without extending that period of lower cooperation. Do we have access to intelligence assets on the ground to fight a holding action supported by drone or missile strikes from offshore ships and planes? Could we intensify aerial reconnaissance in this period to guide missile strikes? Or would public opposition to such tactics just lengthen the gap or compel the new government to withhold cooperation?
I just don't know what we can do other than hold tight, raise our guard, and wait for the gap to close.
