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Friday, February 05, 2010

Maybe the Day After

This writer thinks that it is a real possibility that Israel will use nukes to disarm Iran since Israel cannot take down Iran's nuclear program with conventional forces. He uses a projected conversation between Netanyahu and Obama to argue for this result, during which the former tells our president that Israel will strike Iran, including this bombshell to the president:

[My] military advisers all agree that we do not have sufficient conventional firepower to accomplish the mission. We are compelled to use tactical nuclear weapons. It is the only way we can be sure of success.

Eight years ago, I'd have agreed. Maybe even four years ago, too. But Israel has had many years to prepare for launching a strike on Iran. I'd be shocked if Israel wanted to start with nukes. Sure, I agree that if Israel thought they had no choice, they'd use nukes. But I'm not terribly sure that Israel's small nukes could do a better job than precision conventional weapons on buried nuclear sites. And I'm very sure that Israel wouldn't use nukes as anything but a last resort.

Israel can take a shot at Iran. Maybe they can take more than just a single shot.

If the Israelis strike, it will be with conventional weapons. If that turns out not to work, then the speculation about nukes gets more real.

UPDATE: Attempts by three entities to game efforts to halt Iran's nuclear efforts indicated that they are likely to fail. Together, the efforts show:


Based on available information, the games seemed to be well done -- they added to the insights obtained through standard analytical methods, and more such games would appear to be in order. Any one of them would have been worthwhile on their own, but taken together they are even more valuable. Using similar issues and agents, they yielded some of the same negative outcomes:


* The United States did not obtain meaningful cooperation from other countries.


* Sanctions did not seem to work.


* The United States was unwilling to use military force or support Israeli military action even after other measures failed.


* U.S.-Israeli relations deteriorated dramatically.


* Iran continued toward a nuclear weapons capability.

The key to stopping our slow drift to failure and a nuclear Iran is to reverse the variable of US unwillingness to use military power. At best, we should take the responsibility of launching a multi-week campaign that not only takes down Iran's nuclear infrastructure, but blunts Iran's counter-attack capabilities by taking on Iran's military assets and political leadership.
 
Second best would be to pursue negotiations while making sure Iran knew that if Israel attacks Iran's nuclear forces and Iran responds with attacks on us or oil shipping, that we will carry out missions to blunt Iran's counter-attack capabilities by striking Iran's military assets and political leadership. Our recent efforts to bolster missile defenses in the Gulf would be useful in shielding our assets and allies from the first blows while we execute offensive missions.