Should the Army back off its restoration of the division as the building block of large-scale land combat operations? Brigades had the flexibility for counter-insurgency. I think the shift is fully justified to coordinate more joint assets to fight ground enemies.
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Is the Army focus on division-level capabilities wrong?
The Army needs to be optimized to meet the threats against which it would have the least amount of time to adapt, which means a Chinese joint island landing campaign. To meet that threat, the Army needs decentralized, flexible forces that can counter Chinese strategic surprise, deny Beijing a fait accompli, and regain the initiative.
I don’t think the Army is wrong. Even though I share the author's concern about it getting stuck in a "methodical battle" mindset.
I am fully aware I am not and never have been an officer with deep knowledge of combat requirements. But I feel better about my judgment because the author thinks island operations supporting the Navy is the primary Army mission. I strongly disagree.
About such island operations. An Army corps headquarters was eventually deployed to command Army and Marine divisions on that island.
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NOTE: Map from Graeme Kent's Guadalcanal: island ordeal (Ballantine Books, 1971).
