We're in November. Another winter approaches and Russia was unable to deliver a knock-out blow despite a gap in American weapons support for Ukraine early in the year. That is an accomplishment for Ukraine. But Ukraine needs to do something to win and not merely not lose. Still, not losing is better than losing. And events can rescue you. Will Russia give Ukraine the gift of time?
I worry that Ukraine recently seems to be losing territory more rapidly than it has so far this year. I worry this change could be meaningful. Even patriots desperate to avoid being conquered by a brutal enemy can crack.
Yet it is easy for Westerners to only see the surface of relentless Russian advances seemingly oblivious to losses without seeing what it can look like from the other side. As Igor Gurkin, "imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer", observed:
Girkin assessed that the Ukrainian Summer–Fall 2024 defensive operation was successful in achieving its goals of repelling Russian offensives with minimal territorial losses; delivering strong counterattacks; preserving unused reserves; and maintaining morale within the military and society.
That's a much more pessimistic view of Russian military performance from someone who wants Russia to win. As we compare the more visible problems of Ukraine to the problems Russia cloaks in secrecy behind its bravado of relentless pursuit of victory, what don't we see?
One thing we can't see is the attitudes of Russians who shuffle along quietly hoping they or their family members don't catch the eye of the Russian military grabbing recruits to die in Ukraine. Post-Cold War freedoms for a while let Russians see the true human cost of defeating Nazi Germany, which affected their attitudes about invading Ukraine:
This was the first major war Russia fought since World War II. Naturally, the poor preparation and high casualty rates were expected. What has changed is that, unlike World War II, Russians have more opportunities to avoid going to Ukraine at all. Post-Soviet Russia no longer has the feared KGB and nationwide network of informers. Also absent was a homicidal maniac like World War II leader Josef Stalin. Putin tried to emulate all these World War II era tools but was unable to do so.
But does it matter? Maybe Russia is on the path to faltering. I can't know. But I certainly don't believe sanctions--never decisive on their own--are counter-productive. Never trust the source of that claim. While Russia's economy is holding together "good enough for government work", others judge it to have problems:
As the war goes on Russia receives less and less for the oil it smuggles out past the sanctions. The Americans have taken the lead in maintaining the sanctions and have been successful at it. The result is that the Russian economy is a wreck and will take a decade to rebuild and repair the damage once the war is over.
Russia can focus what it has on military production. But civilians suffer to do that.
Is this a path to Russia faltering?
Kirill's rebuke of Russians who are apathetic and disinterested in the war suggests that the Kremlin may be increasingly concerned about the sustainability of Russian society's support for the war. Recent Russian opinion polls have suggested that support for local Russian government entities and some Kremlin policies, including the invasion of Ukraine, may be wavering, although Russian citizens continue to widely support Russian President Vladimir Putin.It may seem contradictory that possibly peace-curious inclinations exist alongside wide support for Putin. But this could become another "if only the tsar knew!" moment that spirals out of the tsar's control.
But if Ukraine falters first--or more to the point if the West that provides Ukraine with the means to resist destruction by Russia falters--we may never know how close Russia was to losing before it wins.
UPDATE (Monday): Related thoughts.
UPDATE (Tuesday): Russia invaded Ukraine. So stop acting like Russia is the party interested in peace:
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's (RFE/RL) Sistema project released an investigation on November 4 detailing Russia's initial 2022 demands for Ukraine's total capitulation, further supporting ISW's long-standing assessment that Russia has never been willing to engage in good-faith negotiations with Ukraine on any terms but its own.
UPDATE (Tuesday): I suppose I should link the RFE/RL article.
UPDATE (Sunday): Ukraine's strategic air campaign continues:
Ukraine attacked Moscow on Sunday with at least 34 drones, the biggest drone strike on the Russian capital since the start of the war in 2022, forcing flights to be diverted from three of the city's major airports and injuring at least one person.
This does damage to Russian war potential and is a force dragging Russian air defenses back home, just as Germany's air defenses were pulled back from the fronts to Germany in World War II.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.
NOTE: I'm adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.
NOTE: You may also read my posts on Substack, at The Dignified Rant: Evolved.
NOTE: I made the image with Bing.
