I'm all on board the argument that America needs to revive its Navy to cope with China. But I object to defining China as the universe of our threats and treating the First Island Chain as our Maginot Line to prevent war. And also, define "sea power" as it applies to reviving our Navy.
Sure:
According to a recent analysis from the U.S. Department of Defense, the PLAN is focused on the PRC’s ability to “fight and win wars” against a “strong enemy (强敌)” (aka the United States). This may not represent a clear desire to launch a preemptive offensive against the United States Navy per se; Beijing has more restrained national interests to protect on the high seas, including valuable trade routes in the Maritime Silk Road. However, given China’s increasingly aggressive stance towards its neighbors, America cannot afford to assume innocent motives, especially in light of China’s recent confrontations with the Philippines, disregard for international law, and of course, public preparation for Taiwan reunification, by force if necessary.
But really?
If the United States is serious about retaining its global relevance and military edge in an era of Great Power competition, it cannot afford to permit an outdated defense industrial base, political malpractice, legacy planning, or short-term crises in periphery areas of the globe to sap its resources and strategic focus from the overwhelming priority: deterring the PLAN from a Pacific war. [emphasis added]
I'm very worried about our Navy and its leadership:
The Navy's admirals don't seem to realize that they need to get serious about preparing their service for a war in which American control of the seas is not assured.
But treating China as the only threat is dangerous. Remember, in that DOD analysis the author cites, the United States calls China the "pacing challenge" against which we judge our capabilities--not the threat we have to totally focus on because it is the mostly likely war we'll fight:
The 2022 National Security Strategy states that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the only competitor to the United States with the intent and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order. As a result, the 2022 National Defense Strategy identifies the PRC as the “pacing challenge” for the Department of Defense
Europe is an economy-of-force front, but it is an important front.
Africa is lower down in priorities, but still a front.
And the Middle East still requires our attention to defend the gains we've made since America had to escalate its role and commitments during periods of major threats to stability and Western prosperity. This is the more visible part of the Global Troubles to keep jihadis from threatening America at home.
The initial author notes the importance of global sea trade. But that's a global system of trade. Can we really just abandon defending it in select areas without crippling the whole?
Further, we often boast that an American strategic advantage is our large number of friends
and allies. But that isn't a given in the power equation. Eventually, if we get tunnel vision on INDOPACOM, our position in the rest of the world will be weakened by other enemies enough to undermine our overall power by stripping away allies or demanding their focus on areas we ignore. We'd be treating the First Island Chain in the Pacific as our very own Maginot Line that our enemies go around.
And then China could pounce.
Clearly, we've been pivoting to focus on China ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union. We have very few forces committed to Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, or Africa. I think it is ridiculous to argue we are distracted by the rest of the world. How much more should we withdraw? We're damned close to the point in those areas where the only thing left to pack up and take home are the cemeteries of our troops who died in combat overseas to protect America.
And pray tell, just how do we pack even more forces into limited bases in the western Pacific? I fear we would just put our best military assets in easy reach of an initial theater-wide Pearl Harbor by China.
Finally, "sea power" is too broad of a term to be useful for defining how we revive our Navy. Sea power consists of winning sea control and projecting power ashore from the sea. Those are different things and I believe they require different types of ships (and different quantities).
Let's define what we need our Navy to do to face China. But don't neglect the rest of the world or the land and air power needed for our global interests. Hell, don't think the sole means of defeating, deterring, or distracting China consists of air and naval power, as I argued in Military Review. I consider that approach a supporting effort to push China's focus away from the First Island Chain.
NOTE: The image was made from DALL-E.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
