The war in Ukraine goes on as Russia holds its ground in the south and batters against Ukrainian forces in the east. Can Ukraine break the territorial stalemate?
My hope has been that Ukraine can maintain their offensive through the winter. This could crack the Russian army as Ukraine's careful attacks inflict disproportional casualties on the Russian army despite the territorial stalemate of barely moving front lines. The Russians seem to be cooperating by launching failed attacks in the east, notably a big one at Avdiivka that Russia stubbornly continues despite large losses.
But that long-term hope for attrition--a dicey thing to rely on for battlefield victory--also risks failure of Western will to fully support Ukraine's desire to reclaim the territory and people Russia has captured. Which could be vital to win a future Russian invasion.
ISW will not speculate on the scope and prospects of ongoing Ukrainian activity on the east bank of Kherson Oblast but does not assess that Ukrainian forces have created a bridgehead on the east bank of Kherson Oblast suitable for the further maneuver of sizeable mechanized forces at this time. However, it is noteworthy that prominent and generally reliable Russian sources are discussing Ukrainian activities on the east bank as occurring at a larger scale than previously documented tactical cross-river raids by Ukrainian forces.
Early in the war I expected a Ukrainian counteroffensive from this area. I assumed it would rely on capturing intact bridges as it trapped Russians on the west side of the river. I had worried that a counteroffensive further east that advanced south toward Melitopol would expose long flanks to Russian counter-attacks.
After Russia withdrew from the west bank of the Dnieper River and blew the bridges, I knew that a Ukrainian attack would be much harder. The river is a major obstacle. Ukraine would need to build and defend bridges as well as defeat the Russians using the river as a defense line. I also thought the weaknesses the Russians displayed in their weakened army lessened my flank worries about a Ukrainian strike south launched further east, making that drive more likely, The flooding of the river banks by the destruction of the Dnieper River Kakhovka dam in June made the Kherson front impossible.
But since the Ukrainian summer offensive in the south has stalled--in large measure because Ukraine gave Russia time to recover and build fortifications*--I've looked for another option. As Ukraine conducts a campaign against Russian-occupied Crimea to hurt the logistics support for Russian troops in southern Ukraine, I've wondered if the Kherson front was being reopened. Ukraine has conducted raids, but nothing solid showed it would be a major front.
Yet Russians are worried. And Russia has stripped the Kherson front of its best troops to reinforce the rest of the front where Ukraine was attacking. The river is a big obstacle. But Ukraine has had time to cope. Further, talk of stalemate in the West may be fed by NATO disinformation to hide a shift in the offensive. Could Ukraine be hiding their shift of some forces from the now-low level southern offensive to the Kherson front?
Even now, the Ukrainian force on the east bank is small--just two companies plus whatever other small contingents are operating there. But it is bigger. Is the ground drying out? Including the land revealed as the big reservoir east of the blown damn dries? Is Ukraine ready to ferry assault forces--by ferry, boat, and helicopter--and build pontoon bridges to feed mechanized troops across the river? Heck, could Ukraine have built a submerged bridge already? Can Ukraine then defend the bridges from air attacks? The ATACMS certainly put more Russian air fields at risk. Can Ukraine hit the Kerch Strait bridge and put it out of action? Can Ukraine attack lines of communication to slow down Russian reinforcements that would react to that crossing?
If this is a possibility, the Ukrainian forces attacking south toward Melitopol would become a supporting force that could exploit a Russian withdrawal to cope with the Ukrainian offensive on the thinnest part of Russia's front. And that attack would disrupt the Russian rush to the Kherson front.
Or maybe it is just a continuing effort by Ukraine to pin Russian units in place on a quiet front to support efforts further east.
Or maybe the war really is stalemated and a war of attrition. Victory may rely on one side's army cracking under the pressure on a key portion of the front. A crack the other side is able to exploit.
Or the war will decline until it is a low-level conflict along a new line of contact farther into Ukraine than the 2015 line was.
Heck, if Ukrainian pressure is bad enough--or the Russian army is in worse shape than it appears--you might see the Russians step back in the south to a defensive belt beyond current Ukrainian tube artillery range and let the Ukrainians advance into a scorched-earth territory. That's a standard method of trading space for time that the Germans used on the Eastern Front in World War II.
This would buy a lot of time as Ukraine advances and has to build new logistics lines and facilities. It potentially make the Ukrainian troops without extensive fortifications in their liberated territory vulnerable to a Russian spring offensive.
UPDATE (Monday): Indeed:
It is impossible to know if the recent flurry of [Ukrainian] activity along the river is a prelude to a more ambitious operation, as some prominent Russian military bloggers believe, or a continuation of a campaign designed to exploit Russian weak points and force the Kremlin to stretch its military resources.
UPDATE (Tuesday): Yeah, that's as good a guess as any:
Now in its 20th month, Russia's invasion of Ukraine is approaching its second winter, shifting again into a new phase with no clear indication that either side has the upper hand.
I continue to think the battlefield balance tilts to Ukraine. But as long as the territorial stalemate continues, it is hard to take advantage of that edge and expand it into battlefield victory.
Internal factors in both Russia and Ukraine (and its Western backers) may end up being the decisive factor.
UPDATE (Wednesday): Yesterday I saw footage of Ukrainian engineers practicing with German ferry/bridge equipment. Is that to reinforce a bluff? Or is it meant to seem like a bluff to conceal real intent? regardless, the capability exists.
But as I've long said, Ukraine needs a success somewhere. I've recently worried about Ukraine's Avdiivka salient getting cut off. and that's only about a five-mile gap between the Russian pincers.
Russia has suffered huge losses of men and armored vehicles there in a big effort to cut off the Ukrainians.
But Russia's pincers are themselves salients. And with the Russians leaning forward without extensive defenses and suffering heavy losses, Ukraine might want to consider using its reserves to counter-attack those pincers to cut them off. That would relieve the pressure on Avdiivka's flanks and inflict a sizable defeat on the Russian army.
The Ukraine would be free to reconstitute the reserves used to hopefully exploit a tactical success in the south if it can be achieved in the coming months.
UPDATE (Wednesday): Well sure, if Ukraine doesn't change the path that Russia appears intent on followiing:
A former Ukrainian presidential adviser has warned that Kyiv's forces will not be able to hold on to Avdiivka, the Donetsk town where fierce fighting is raging.
Maybe Ukraine would have more success with combined arms operations when hitting tired and depleted Russian units that don't have extensive fortifications and minefields to hold the line.
UPDATE (Thursday): Ukraine doesn't seem terribly active in their two major low-level offensives in the south aimed at Melitopol and the fight around Bakhmut. Could Ukraine be preparing for either a counter-attack at Avdiivka or a new effort on the Kherson front?
UPDATE (Thursday): It seems as if Russia is attacking significantly more than Ukraine is attacking recently. Is the initiative shifting back to Russia? But can that be sustained as it burns through men and materiel to restart their offensive? Or is this temporary as Ukraine repositions reserves for an attack in a different location?
UPDATE (Friday): Additional American military aid to Ukraine, mostly ammunition.
UPDATE (Saturday): Interesting: "Russia is executing soldiers who try to retreat from a bloody offensive in eastern Ukraine, the White House has said." That may mean the Russian ground forces are teetering. But you have to make a hard push to exploit that.
*Ukraine may have had no choice but to delay their counteroffensive given the slowness of Western equipment to arrive. But the failure is still real.
NOTE: ISW updates continue here.
NOTE: I'm still adding updates on the Last Hamas War in this post.
