China would like to defeat Taiwan before America can intervene. I've long thought that was true. But is the time it would take America to decide to intervene really the primary brake on American action? And how quickly can China win? Also, define "win".
I've long believed that China does not need to defeat America in order to defeat Taiwan. China only needs to delay American intervention:
As I've droned on repeatedly here, China does not need to defeat America to conquer Taiwan. China needs to defeat Taiwan to conquer Taiwan. And to defeat Taiwan, China only needs to delay our intervention long enough to defeat and conquer Taiwan. This is a far less difficult mission than deterring America or defeating us.That was an assumption of my invasion scenario.
How much time does China have to win before America intervenes?
This analysis of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is interesting when considering the chance of success for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan before America can even intervene. It starts with the assumption--probably correct--that a Bolt from the Blue invasion would be impossible:
This campaign analysis seeks to determine how long U.S. decision-makers can realistically have those debates before the PLA seizes Taipei and the window for effective intervention with military force has closed. ...
For the analysis that follows, the U.S. and Taiwan modify their assessments from “invasion possible” to “invasion likely” one month prior to the cross-strait assault. This is a generous assumption for China, as during the Russian invasion of Ukraine the U.S. had reliable intelligence of a coming invasion nearly five months before its start.6 In this PLA-best-case scenario, a combination of PRC operational security, messaging, misinformation, and military deception enables this surprise.
So we have advanced notice. But intervening quickly will be difficult:
the Biden Administration would lack the explicit standing legal authorities to intervene that exist with congressionally ratified treaty allies outside the limited War Powers Act. As indications and warnings (I&W) of a possible cross-strait assault emerged, and as the invasion began, a robust and likely time-consuming interagency debate would occur within the White House, Pentagon, and on Capitol Hill.
Also, what is China trying to achieve?
The desired endstate for the PLA is the complete seizure of Taipei and the inability for Taiwanese forces south of the city to counterattack and liberate the capital. The desired endstate for the PRC is dislocation, dissolution, or capitulation of the Republic of China (ROC) government and successful (re)unification of the island with the mainland before U.S. intervention can occur.
Under the analysis, China wins in a couple months:
While combat operations may continue on the island, the above modeling shows the practical window for U.S. intervention in a Taiwan invasion prior to the seizure of Taipei and the displacement, dissolution, or capitulation of the ROC government effectively closes 31 days after the initial landings. In the scenario, this is 46 days after the start of the JFSO and 76 days after the “invasion likely” assessment[.]
The invasion scenario is interesting. And aiming right for Taipei has long been my assumption about the invasion. But the simulation is suspect because it does not understand the 3:1 rule (quoting the linked author in the post):
While the conventional wisdom that the attacker requires a 3:1 superiority to succeed, the Soviet/Russian Correlation of Forces Methodology is more sophisticated and recognizes that as long as a commander can do economy of force operations in some sectors to enable concentration in others sufficient to overcome the defender, even an overall inferiority of combat power can be made to work. In this case, a 1:1 will serve the purpose.
Running a simulation on the assumption that China needs superiority all across the entire front underestimates how quickly China could pierce the defensive line on a narrow front and bypass other defenders.
I once assumed it would take a lot of time to intervene. But after looking at American reaction to three surprise attacks after World War II when I wrote about a potential role for the American Army (in Military Review), I think America would intervene quickly:
On three occasions when an enemy struck suddenly—in South Korea in 1950, in Kuwait in 1990, and after the 11 September 2001 al-Qaida terror attacks on the U.S. homeland—America’s decisions to react were rapid. In 1950, President Harry Truman ordered American air and naval action just two days after North Korea invaded.30 In 1990, President George H. W. Bush ordered American forces to Saudi Arabia less than a week after Iraq invaded Kuwait.31 And the U.S. Congress authorized military force a week after the terror attacks.32 China is a potential threat far larger than any of the enemies in those three examples, so the American debate could be longer, but China cannot count on a lengthy delay from America’s domestic politics.
There is no way China has 46 days from the start of initial shaping operations to win before America intervenes. When you consider that under a worst case scenario that early indications and warnings would be 30 days before China begins operations, the American debate can start ahead of time.
In addition, the United States won't need to make a decision to fight China to begin moving troops toward and even into Taiwan:
Washington is preparing evacuation plans for US citizens living in Taiwan as Sino-American tensions boil over, according to multiple sources.
The need to evacuate Americans from Taiwan, America has an excuse to alert regional forces and send additional forces toward Taiwan well before a formal decision to fight China over Taiwan is made.
Honestly, that's brilliant if the main purpose is to get American forces into position to intervener and make China watch the American military gear up or look like brutes for attacking a humanitarian mission.
But there's more. Speedy American intervention isn't the end of potential delays. Even after America decides to intervene, there is a source of delay (quoting an older post):
The Chinese aircraft carrier would have a role in slowing down our intervention, too. China's first carrier was for studying and training. China's true carriers will be Chinese designed vessels. Those China probably wouldn't risk. But the old Varyag? If I was in charge of the PLAN (People's Liberation Army Navy), I'd dangle that carrier and some escorts northeast of Taiwan. As I noted, its presence would give us pause. And force us to approach more cautiously.
The final contribution of that first Chinese carrier to delaying our intervention could be to tempt us into taking the time to set up and execute the perfect naval strike mission. Sure, having sovereign pieces of US territory that serve as power projection assets is useful. And the Navy trumpets that mission in budget battles. But the Navy--deep down--wants to exercise sea control and take down another navy that tries to wrest it from us. It would be the best SINKEX, ever.
It gets complicated, no?
But even before considering the complications, the foundation for judging how long China has to defeat Taiwan is flawed. I don't think China has to capture Taipei before America intervenes in order to win. Also from my article:
China does not need to destroy the Taiwanese military, occupy all of Taiwan, or even capture Taipei to win the war. If China can move sufficient army groups onto Taiwan and maintain a reasonable line of supply, it can suspend the war at any time. Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept’s (ODC) core premise is that Taiwanese asymmetric warfare capabilities will target Chinese weaknesses most efficiently “while surviving long enough for third-party intervention.”36 Much of the world—perhaps America especially—would be relieved to have a cease-fire before American and Chinese forces are openly shooting at each other. China would use that cease-fire to strengthen its position on Taiwan and prepare for a second phase of the invasion: the breakout and final conquest of Taiwan.
America will intervene quickly. China doesn't have a lot of time to capture Taipei. But China doesn't need to capture Taipei to set the stage for a future total victory if it gets a ceasefire that accepts Chinese troops remaining on Taiwan.
Will America help Taiwan drive the PLA invaders into the sea? With U.S. Army armored units, if necessary? Or will we fool ourselves that our rapid response compelled China to stop fighting, representing an American victory and a Chinese defeat?
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 continues here.
