Russia's air power hasn't impressed Western observers. But is Russian air power actually doing its job even if Western observers don't appreciate it?
Russia continues to carry out small-scale and intermittently successful attacks across the Donbas front. Where is Russia's vaunted air power that looms menacingly over the battlefield? Only suicide drones/missiles seem to darken Ukrainian skies in attacks on cities.
Assessing Russian air power at war against Ukraine:
Although Russia’s military capabilities have turned out to be less impressive than many in the West thought before this war, the Russian armed forces are neither an operetta-type outfit nor a pushover. As already noted, they can put whole provinces and cities to waste and make up in ruthless brutality much of what they lack in professionalism and prowess. They wage war in an old-fashioned manner, so old-fashioned that we are talking about the Old Testament or the Thirty Year’s War, but unless stopped, that can be terrifyingly effective, as shown in Chechnya.The old fashioned manner relies on ground-based firepower (including ship-based firepower). Whether artillery close to the front or ballistic missiles and drones for deeper strikes.
Note this:
A significant conclusion from this war is that the well-developed GBAD [NOTE: Ground-Based Air Defense] of both sides has been very effective in limiting the enemy’s freedom of action in the air domain and that the importance of ground-based air defence has been underestimated in the West.
As I briefly explained recently:
I think air superiority isn't as important for ground combat in an age of precision, long-range ground artillery. With a caveat that you at least have to nullify enemy air superiority.
The Russians had it right, I believed--if Russia can nullify enemy air power.
I've wondered if Russia's air force will intervene in force during the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Now I wonder if it can even if it wants to. Especially if it gets into maneuver warfare.
But I wonder if even that is the right question. Ultimately Russia doesn't rely on its air power for that ground combat support role. We'll see if Russia's large artillery force is the real mobile firepower that is rushed to the point of Ukraine's counteroffensive to blunt and defeat it.
And as long as Russia can nullify Ukraine's air power to keep that artillery safe, it could be good enough for this war.
Although the form of the Ukrainian counteroffensive may determine what Russia's air power can do. There need to be targets that stand still long enough for Russia's air power to strike.
Ukraine regained large chunks of territory with three methods.
First, Russia faltered in an offensive on Kiev and ordered a withdrawal from territory conquered in northeastern Ukraine. Ukrainian forces largely followed the Russians out rather than push them out.
Then Ukraine rapidly captured a large chunk of territory with a rapid blitzkrieg with a small force in Kharkiv province against Russian resistance that collapsed when hit.
Finally, Ukraine used firepower and small attacks over a long period to compel a Russian withdrawal from the west bank of the Dnieper River in Kherson province when the Russians feared for their lines of communication and supply.
The Ukrainians themselves say they are ready to strike now. Which type of advance will the next Ukrainian advance follow? And will the Ukrainians expose their units to decisive Russian air attack?
That question could be key to whether Ukraine will maintain Western support to eject the Russian invaders.
But back to the general air power issue.
I hold open the possibility that Russia's approach could collapse under attack by stealth aircraft that take apart Russian GBAD and intervene in the ground battles on a large scale.
Mind you, I'm not saying close air support isn't great if you can provide it. But given how low a priority the U. S. Air Force has for providing that, is it any wonder the Army wants its own fire support?
And if the Army had the power to provide its own close fires support, what fire support would it pay for? Would the Army accept Air Force air superiority in the high blue skies (the brown skies where drones roam are a different problem) and use ground-based fires to support troops in combat?
In this light, it will be interesting to see what missions NATO's Air Defender 23 exercise practices. And, of course, we shall see what Russia's air force does when the Ukrainian counteroffensive hits the fan.
UPDATE (Tuesday): It really does seem like Ukraine is trying to bring the war to Russia nominally to spread Russian resources ahead of their counteroffensive:
Russian air defenses stopped eight drones converging on Moscow, officials said Tuesday, in an attack that authorities blamed on Ukraine
UPDATE (Tuesday): Strategypage has a lot of interesting information on the Russians.
One:
When Russia declared victory in Bakhmut, Ukrainian forces were still holding western portions of the city. As Russia began moving most of its troops from the city after the victory announcement, Ukrainian forces advanced and reoccupied the territory Russians had recently captured.
It seemed like Russia captured all of the city. But even if the Russians did not literally it was true for all practical purposes. But it is fascinating that the Russians then gave up some. The announcement of victory was more important than literal complete control. And the cost was high for Russia. Much higher than for Ukraine.
Two, the Ukrainians would like 50 F-16s:
The Ukrainian F-16s will put the Russian air force on the defensive and expose Russian targets to more effective airstrikes.
Well, it would help nullify Russian efforts to operate over Ukraine, I think. And air strikes would have to use stand-off weapons to avoid Russian air defenses.
Three, Russia has been stymied by a layered air defense system Ukraine has built. This seemingly contradicts the talk of doom from the Discord Leaks.
Four, Russian artillery has been hammered:
After two weeks of dedicated and persistent Ukrainian artillery attacks on Russian artillery, rocket launchers and large (120mm and up) caliber mortars the artillery systems available to Russian forces has been reduced by nearly 2,700 along the 1,500 kilometer front line in southeastern and southern Ukraine.
Wow.
Five, Ukraine is incorporating Western tanks into their counteroffensive:
This mobile attack force can move to portions of the front line the Russians were not able to fortify with tank obstacles and landmines. This is what the Russians feared the Ukrainians might do and it means the elaborate defenses Russia has built will be bypassed and the Ukrainian mobile units will capture large portions of Russian occupied Ukraine.
Strategypage also reports that Russian troops are "largely demoralized". This speaks to my hopes, so I'm wary of embracing it.
Six. Russia had to get 300,000 shells from Iran and the same from North Korea:
Russian reserves of 152mm artillery munitions are exhausted and production facilities in Russia are unable to supply additional shells quickly enough to refill the depleted war reserve.
The latter might be because North Korea fears South Korea's large stockpile of 155mm shells.
Do read it all.
UPDATE (Tuesday): This is exactly why I worry about embracing my hopes:
Trusting in the common perception of the state of the Russian military can be designed to be fatal. I have long wondered about the chaotic structure of Russian forces in Ukraine and about the amount of time and resources Russia devotes to secondary targets. It’s tempting to assume that Moscow is foundering or that it was fated to defeat, but the fact that maskirovka is embedded so deeply in the Russian military psyche makes it necessary to periodically rethink Russian plans and resources.
Not that Friedman thinks the exact maskirova outlined is likely. But my worries don't go away about something hidden even though my instinct is to inflict worries on Russia rather than take counsel from my fears.
UPDATE (Tuesday): The most straightforward way to look at Russia's performance is that we are seeing what Russia's military is--and not that Russia has a deep plan hidden by the body count.
For decades, I've read that the North Vietnamese siege of the Marines at Khe Sahn in 1968 was really just a diversion bolstered by heavy NVA losses. It was an "Asiatic" approach to war alien to the West.
But recently, I read that North Vietnamese sources say that the North Vietnamese were absolutely trying to overrun Khe Sahn. It was no deep feint built on mounds of NVA troop casualties.
NOTE: The image was made with DALL-E.
NOTE: ISW coverage of the war continues here. Also, I put war-related links and commentary in the Weekend Data Dump.