This article was a flattering wet kiss to China and a broad and unrealistic condemnation of American policy in the Middle East.
This is how the author frames China's initiative to broker detente between Iran and Saudi Arabia:
China's success is not an indication of its aspirations to unseat the United States in the region but instead a direct byproduct of observing the past 20 years of US Middle East policy and correcting its approach accordingly. Thus, China's achievement in the Middle East should not be defined by the brokering of this deal, but by its avoidance of America's missteps over the past 30 years.
Let's go through this nonsense of three American mistakes that China avoided, shall we? I will resist the temptation to defend America's record.
Anyway, what of China's admirable approach?
America's first mistake was its overreaching aims: attempting to exert its political will on the region by force and expanding its involvement in the Middle East beyond that which serves its security and economic interests. Conversely, China is clear-eyed about its interests in the Middle East and, more importantly, their limits.
China has a base in Djibouti and is building potential bases on the way to Africa ("string of pearls"). Like in the United Arab Emirates. China certainly intends to increase its ability to project military power to the Middle East and Africa.
Because it doesn't like its limits, apparently.
We are not seeing Chinese restraint. We are seeing the early stages of China preparing to project military power into the region to protect its security and economic interests. It's almost funny that American interest in defending regional oil exports was derided as "blood for oil" while China is credited with "clear-eyed" focus on its interests--with energy exports from Iran and Gulf Arab states at the top of that list.
Anyway. The second can't be a weaker argument, right?
America's second mistake was choosing a side, stubbornly committing to a hard line against Iran and mounting obligations to Saudi Arabia. China, however, rejects this constraint of ideological politics, toeing the line between cooperating with both without alienating either.
Again, we're in the early weeks of this Saudi-Iranian detente that papers over centuries of religious, ethnic, and territorial disputes. The honeymoon won't last long. Can China preserve the detente? That might require more Chinese military power and political intervention to make China's diplomatic initiative seem more valuable to local states than resuming historic conflict to deny the other side victories.
And it assumes that the detente is a Chinese initiative rather than a means for Iran and Saudi Arabia to pursue their objectives that undermine the other rival with the threat of Chinese intervention if one party overtly breaks the deal with direct attacks.
China can reject the reality of the region's hatreds and politics all it wants. But wanting to avoid alienating either is not the same as being able to avoid that. Indeed, refusing to act against either when both expect help could just alienate both.
And finally:
America's third mistake was inflicting its moral compass onto its economic affairs. President Joe Biden's narrative, a fight between democracies and autocracies in pursuit of a liberal world order, is a dangerous one, especially as American clients outside of the West grow weary of American chastisement and coerced human-rights concessions.
This is a damned if you do and damned if you don't judgment. America gets hammered when it deals with despots. And in this article gets hammered for raising objections to despot behavior. So ... whatever.
But I digress.
So what about China? About that. China's so-called superior model of "high corruption, low human rights, low environmental regulations and low morality" actually encourages bad behavior where it invests so freely without America's position:
Beijing’s involvement in Africa raises several red flags, not only because of the Chinese government’s exploitative intentions but also because of the “China model,” in particular serious human rights abuses and corruption against Africans.
Add in the "debt-trap" angle of China's massive investments that make investment targets quasi-colonies for resource extraction, and I fail to see how investment recipients other than those at the top of the pyramid benefit.
Is this path really the way to win hearts and minds in autocracies? Indeed, isn't China's approach designed to encourage autocracy and despotism vulnerable to Chinese debt pressure?
Doesn't that reliance on local allies that are a narrow minority at the top threaten the so-called "limits" China accepts for its diplomacy if the base of the pyramid objects violently?
Doesn't this third admirable approach actually impose China's moral compass on its economic affairs?
I just don't see the brilliance being projected on China's actions. Perhaps this is a danger when you wrongly assume China's leaders have unique long-range planning abilities.
You can praise China all you want on the figurative Day One of its diplomatic initiative that takes advantage of what America achieved. Get back to me when the problems inevitably rise up and China's new partners look to China for help.
UPDATE: What? China hasn't solved the Iran-Saudi Arabia struggle in Yemen already?
Peace negotiations seemed promising earlier in the year but have stalled, mainly because the Shia rebels, the Yemen government and Saudi Arabia cannot agree on who should get what.
NOTE: TDR Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
