Not that there hasn't been a lot of death and destruction over the past four months, but the war had been on a deadly simmer. Ukraine has been training men and trying to accelerate Western weapons deliveries. Russia has been mobilizing people and industry--with unclear results--to rebuild its ravaged military. Russia won that race. The war has re-ignited with a slowly growing Russian offensive intensity in the Donbas.
Russia’s self-proclaimed war on NATO has a certain logical conclusion that Wagner’s leader expressed. Even though it is hyperbolic, it is aspirational:
Prigozhin added that Russian society would need to be drastically militarized for the Kremlin to reach the English Channel, likely either hyperbolizing Russia’s aims of destroying NATO or referring to the Cold War-era Soviet war plans aimed at conducting a rapid blitzkrieg to the Channel coast.
But first Russia has to conquer Ukraine. While Russia has done enough to restart their offensive, there are as yet few signs--with the exception of slow gains around Bakhmut--that Russia is defeating the Ukrainians along the limited front lines of Russia's attacks.
Russia's rearming to conquer Ukraine appears to have fallen short:
Russia’s costly military campaign in Ukraine has likely significantly depleted Russian equipment and manpower reserves necessary to sustain a successful large-scale offensive in eastern Ukraine.But if given time, Russia can rebuild. Will Ukraine strike before Russia rebuilds?
Ukraine likely continues to have a window of opportunity to initiate large-scale counteroffensives over the next few months, but its ability to do so likely rests heavily on the speed and scale at which the West provides it the necessary materiel, particularly tanks and armored vehicles.
I've worried that promised Ukrainian decisive counteroffensives to inflict a decisive defeat on Russia's ground forces keep getting postponed. Ukraine has pushed Russia back and liberated territory, but Russia's ground forces are the center of gravity. Break them and Russia must retreat to Russia itself.
I believed Ukraine would strike sooner. But clearly Ukraine has been weaker than I expected from its battlefield casualties, despite holding off the Russians. And now we are told that Ukraine will strike in the spring. This time for sure.
Giving Russia time is dangerous. This has been my worry:
Over the past year, Ukraine has fared much better than expected, and Russia much worse. But major powers have the luxury of early stumbling, their size giving them the resources needed to recover from early defeats. The successes of weaker powers sometimes die on the vine.
Hence my callback to the 1939-1940 Winter War for my current name for Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
But Ukraine has--for now--the backing of the West's industrial, financial, and technological might, negating
Russia's economic edge. And Russia's 3:1 population edge isn't the
direct advantage you might think given Ukraine's much higher motives to avoid
defeat. If Russia loses, Russian soldiers go home. If Ukraine loses, the Russian atrocities will go on for a generation to stamp out resistance.
A lot is riding on defeating this new Russian offensive campaign. And if Ukraine wins it, a lot rides on Ukraine's next campaign.
The major phase of Russian offensive operations in Luhansk Oblast is underway, and Russia likely lacks sufficient uncommitted reserves to dramatically increase the scale or intensity of the offensive this winter.
ISW doesn't see the Russian reserves that might get their offensive rolling forward. But they concede they might be there. Again, my fear is that we might not see all that Russia has.
UPDATE (Tuesday): Will the meat keep running toward the meat grinder?
A year of fighting in Ukraine has left the Russian army defeated, depleted and demoralized. Most of the army personnel available before the invasion have been killed, wounded or missing (captured, deserted or body not found).
Also, Russia's leadership is crippled even as Ukraine's remains intact.
NOTE: ISW coverage of the war continues here.
