My assumption about a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is that China needs to defeat Taiwan but only delay America and its allies. So China would not target America or Japan when China invades Taiwan. Buying time while America decides to intervene could be invaluable. My caveat has been that if China ever assumes America will intervene quickly, then including American and Japanese targets at H-Hour would make sense. Are we getting to that position?
HIMARS with anti-ship missiles (or any anti-ship missile system) on Japan's Yonaguni Island just east of Taiwan would be able to target Chinese invasion ships heading for Taiwan.
America and Japan holding strong points in those islands would also complicate Chinese efforts to deploy their navy east of Taiwan to interdict Japanese and American help heading to Taiwan. China is practicing in that area:
The biggest contribution Japan can make to a Taiwan contingency is the rock solid protection of Japanese territory, while the U.S. does some of the other things.
Japan is arming up. Assuming that is used for rock solid protection of Japanese territory all the way south to the rocks by Taiwan, that complicates Chinese plans by shielding American and Japanese access to Taiwan. I worry that Japan might recoil from defending its Ryuku outposts. Like their older plans for defending islands closer to Japan, could Japan seek to avoid offending China with a plan to race China to threatened islands?
Marines might operate in the Ryukyu Islands, too. This is still a goal. But as I noted at the end of this post, can we supply them so far inside China's missile envelopes?
But while China would have advantages from taking some of those Japanese islands near Taiwan, I think China's ambitions thus far aren't likely to include using its carriers to win control of the seas around Taiwan against American and Japanese intervention, as that Proceedings article assessed:
The PLAN is certainly drawn to the international prestige of operating aircraft carriers. However, the centerpiece of PLAN strategy, especially over the next decade, will likely continue to be the strike capabilities of its surface combatants and submarines.
While no doubt helpful, I don't think China needs to control those waters to successfully invade Taiwan. China already has land-based anti-ship assets (A2/AD capabilities) and the threat of their new fleet to keep America away long enough to achieve local victories.
Yet if China finds they need all their marines to hit Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands (to pierce that shield for much of Taiwan's coast), can any be spared for occupying the Ryukyus? The latest DOD report on Chinese military power credits China with 8 marine brigades. Although I think that includes supporting brigades and not just maneuver brigades. There probably aren't enough to spare from the primary mission, regardless of how useful the mission could be.
Remember, China has to defeat Taiwan. China does not need to defeat America (and now Japan) to successfully invade Taiwan--just delay America and Japan from intervening. To achieve the delay that China needs to defeat Taiwan, China might consider deploying for a battle east of Taiwan to contest those waters--perhaps adding vital time to America's decision to intervene--long enough to defeat Taiwan.
And if America intervenes quickly? China's carriers, especially their early smaller carriers, would be an easy sacrifice to make for further delaying America:
The Navy might be so mesmerized by the opportunity to relive their glory days of the Pacific theater in World War II that they'll take their eye off the ball.
China would totally sacrifice inferior carriers, most important as stepping stones in construction and training to more capable carriers in the 2030s, if China can gain their most core of core interests in the face of American opposition.
NOTE: Winter War of 2022 coverage continues here.
