Tanks can be killed. They have a history of being killed. But they are no more extinct because of that than humans are since the invention of the pointy, fire-hardened stick. Until there is a replacement for the mobile protected firepower tanks provide, tanks will be what we have.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine shows no such thing:
The success of Ukrainian forces in countering Russian armored vehicle columns with missiles and rockets in the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine shows the vulnerability of tanks to missile-armed infantry, the Marine Corps commandant said, and seemed to reinforce his decision to shed tanks from the Corps as part of his Force Design 2030 concept.
Who didn't know tanks are vulnerable to anti-tank weapons? Lack of combined arms--supporting tanks with infantry, artillery, and air power--could explain Russian losses more readily than saying tanks are obsolete, as the Marine Corps Commandant correctly observed:
The Russians also are showing weakness in combined arms – infantry and armor and maneuver warfare. “One without the other is very ineffective.”That is the key. Tanks have suffered huge losses from the beginning. In World War I it was largely from mechanical breakdowns. By World War II, tanks were lost in huge numbers in combat, too. Are people obsolete because they are vulnerable to bullets and shrapnel?
I admit that tanks as we build them today may well be obsolete one day:
Will the Army choose another Abrams secure in the knowledge that active protection systems will make the expensive tank survivable? Or will the Army seek a new Sherman tank that is lethal enough but not terribly survivable--but able to be mass produced?
Would it be too much to ask to build the medium tank, but with options built in to strip the design of much of its armor and gadgets to make it a simpler and lighter tank in case of a long war of attrition against a peer nation requires mass production?
In that post I reviewed the Army looking at replacement for the Abrams that might be lighter, in the same class, or heavier than the Abrams. It may still be unclear what is best.
I think ground and air drones will operate like clouds around manned tanks. But I'm starting to think that for campaigns against peers that the new tank will need to be a Sherman-like vehicle. Cheap enough to lose in large numbers and simple enough to produce in large numbers. The key for vehicle design will be helping a small crew survive hits that knock out the tanks. And seeing if our automobile plants can handle a conversion to such tanks.
And--back to the first article--this is rich from someone trying to keep opposed amphibious landings in the age of cheap anti-ship missiles going:
"Tanks did tremendous work for us for many years in many different scenarios," Berger said. "Going forward, they are heavier, too difficult to logistically support, and in some cases too vulnerable to attack from a proliferation of very inexpensive missiles."
Mobile protected firepower will always be needed. Russia's experience in Ukraine in 2022 is not evidence that tanks don't work. And I suspect the Marines will regret getting rid of all of their tanks. Will the Army be able to attach armor to Marine units that have to fight in a conventional war against a peer enemy?
UPDATE: Does the Army need more than 11 active and 5 National Guard armored brigades? And should they rotate or be permanently stationed? I'd like a robust REPORPOL.
NOTE: War updates continue in this post.
