When I read the headline about Chinese "special forces" being the real threat to Taiwan, I almost disregarded it. But what the author is really talking about is the airborne and air mobile spearhead. Good point.
The primary means of attack would be air/missile strikes followed by airborne attacks:
The main purpose of these strikes, aside from eliminating Taiwan's small navy and air force, would be to clear corridors over the island with massive firepower, paving the way for PLA soldiers to insert via parachute and helicopter.
So it really isn't "special forces"--although those would play a role--but non-amphibious forces.
As I've long argued, even America doesn't have the amphibious capability to throw anything close to hundreds of thousands of troops across beaches. China's capability is weaker and mostly a red herring. So it is misleading to track Chinese amphibious warfare vessels as a metric for invasion capability.
The analysis fits with my view on invading without naval superiority (oddly, I have two copies of that post) which drove my invasion scenario. Although I do assume naval landings at ports as part of the actual assault:
The actual invasion will have started before the shooting starts. Special forces and intelligence officers will infiltrate Taiwan, placing navigation aids to guide parachutists and missiles, and preparing for direct attacks on Taiwanese strategic assets. They might even stock warehouses with consumable supplies and vehicles to be used by the invaders.
Civilian merchant ships on scheduled arrivals will be loaded with supplies, weapons, and light infantry battalions and will sail into Taiwanese ports on both coasts. ...Warships, amphibious warfare, and drafted commercial ships loaded with troops put to sea and aircraft take off.
For the first impact, Chinese special forces and intelligence operatives hit radar stations, assassinate leaders, sabotage crucial bridges and tunnels, hit Patriot missile sites and communication centers, anti-ship missile batteries, ammunition depots, and strike at air fields.
The light infantry on the merchant ships in Taiwanese harbors will unload and attempt to seize the ports on the west coast or, on the east coast, sabotage facilities and otherwise prevent the Americans and Japanese from using them to reinforce the Taiwanese. Their very presence will deter or at least delay reinforcements. ...
The Chinese will drop their parachute divisions near Taipei to go right for the jugular by seizing the center of government. (I've read the Chinese can lift 22,000 in one day so this should be possible.) With an airfield secured, the Chinese will airlift their urban cavalry division to march on the capital itself. The parachute units will try to cordon off the capital to keep reinforcements from coming in to the rescue. ...
With light infantry already unloaded from civilian shipping in Taiwan's harbors, the invasion force will sail in to reinforce them. Obsolete warships, either converted into troop ships or just emptied of most ammunition and crammed with troops, will make a high speed dash for the ports. Merchant ships taken into the service of the PLAN will begin lifting 9 divisions of infantry from widely spread ports. Roll on/roll off ships will carry heavy armor and artillery to unload in the ports. From the Pescadores [after taking them], additional forces will be sent against the beaches of Taiwan with the amphibious warfare assets and air cushion vehicles to spread the Taiwanese out.
Forces will move out as soon as possible to head inland and relieve the airborne assault forces at Taipei.
China's marine forces would have smaller but important direct and supporting roles.
As that initial author notes, the Chinese surface navy might not be that important given Chinese air power, subs, and mines to keep the strait sufficiently open.
Heck, the Chinese navy might outplay our Navy by distracting it with a SINKEX long enough for the PLA to get ashore in force.
On the other hand, I think the author credits light PLA forces with too much power if the Taiwanese promptly counterattack with conventional artillery-supported infantry and armored brigades. Which is why I assume a major Chinese seaborne reinforcement of the initial light forces.
China needs to get ashore and quickly either win or get a ceasefire. If the PLA remains on Taiwan even if it fails to capture Taipei, China has won, as I discussed in Military Review.
UPDATE: China appears to be greatly expanding conventional ballistic missiles rather than nuclear-tipped versions, contrary to initial conclusions. That's some expensive artillery that relies on quickly winning a war.
