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Monday, October 25, 2021

A Bridgehead Too Far?

China is improving its ability to sustain an air campaign over Taiwan. If this speeds up Chinese operations to establish bridgeheads and airheads on Taiwan, we risk China remaining on Taiwan even if we avoid a direct America-China war over Taiwan.

China increases its air options:

China is upgrading three airbases located opposite Taiwan, boosting its airpower capability in an already tense region that is flush with air combat capabilities. Construction of the new infrastructure began in early 2020 and continued uninterrupted through the pandemic, underlining its priority.

The ranges are calculated based on distance to Taipei.


But I think it is useful for air operations considerations. Those airfields are even more important if a Chinese invasion of Taiwan goes right for the jugular:

If speed is the key to China winning (by defeating Taiwan before America can lead an intervention), maybe China uses their limited amphibious assets to hit the mouth of the Tamshui (or Tamsui) River and advance on Taipei to support airborne forces also hitting the capital. Indeed, the river is apparently navigable, and so the Chinese might be able to sail ro-ro (loaded with tanks and other heavy equipment) and container ships right into the river to reinforce the lighter amphibious and airborne forces fighting inside Taipei.

Amphibious operations using older warships and civilian merchant ships to hit northern ports would take place as I speculated, and then drive on Taipei with heavier ground forces brought in by ships through the captured ports.

I think the Chinese want to end operations before America can intervene. As I've constantly written, China needs to defeat Taiwan. China needs to delay America.

And ending operations includes a ceasefire that leaves Chinese troops occupying a bridgehead on Taiwan that can be reinforced and used as a jumping off point for the resumption of the invasion even years later, as I wrote about in Military Review.

Don't let the Chinese remain on Taiwan except as POWs.

UPDATE: The Taiwanese flying the planes and firing the missiles may be technically proficient. But if the Chinese get ashore the ability and will to fight needs to be broad:

Grant Newsham, a retired U.S. Marines colonel who spent 2019 in Taiwan studying the island’s defenses, said Taiwan has a solid core of well-trained troops and "superb officers that are ready to fight." Other military experts compare Taiwan’s top pilots and officers to the world’s best.

But the Taiwanese military is underfunded, and its reserves system is a shambles, Mr. Newsham said. It needs improved pay packages, and it could become far more effective by training with the U.S. and its allies, he said.

A sense of urgency on Taiwan would help. Don't assume the Chinese threat is decades away.

UPDATE: Perhaps Taiwan is lucky and there is mutual assured apathy:

Young Chinese are curtailing their expectations and ambitions. Many of them are downgrading lifestyle choices around diet, travel, and more. They fill social media with talks of the futility of endeavoring and the hollowness of desire. And they are not ready for marriage and children, and don’t know if they will ever be.

To be fair, the recruiting pool here includes young people like that. But what's the PLA made of?