So China will see force as a last resort, Xi Jinping doesn't need Taiwan, and China is unlikely to invade Taiwan because odds of victory are low?
These are interesting articles in opposition to an article warning about war by Skylar Mastro. But let me settle on the first article's assessment that I must object to in regard to all three in one matter--mind reading:
Mastro rightly observes that if China were to take military action against Taiwan, it would have several options, ranging from an invasion to a blockade to the occupation of small offshore islands or strikes on selected economic or political targets. Although some of these options are more realistic than others, all would carry immense risk. Contrary to what Mastro suggests, Beijing is unlikely to attempt any of them unless it feels backed into a corner.
China’s most decisive option would be a cross-strait invasion. But its chances of succeeding today—and for the next decade at least—are poor. Moreover, failure would produce a wrecked fleet and an army of prisoners of war in Taiwan, an outcome that even Beijing would be unable to spin as a victory. If, as most China analysts believe, regime security is the top priority for Chinese leaders, an invasion would risk everything on dim prospects for glory. [emphasis added]
If I may be so bold, China will define when it is backed into a corner and when an invasion provides higher prospects for regime security. As I wrote long ago, China's rulers will define what is rational--not us:
So despite my feeling that the Chinese would try to make deciding to intervene more difficult for us, I can't rule out that the Chinese look east and decide they can't take the chance of us deciding to intervene quickly and then doing so effectively. We may think that we'd need two weeks to get decisive forces into the battle, but if the Chinese think we can do so in 4 days, attacking us to make sure the PLA gets ten more days to conquer Taiwan becomes prudent and not risky. Or perhaps the Chinese think they need three weeks. Or four. Basically, if the Chinese judge they need more time to win than they think they can get before we intervene, then attacking us either prior to the invasion or during it becomes very rational from their point of view.
This applies to all questions of leadership belief regarding Taiwan.
What if China sees what they think is a decisive if fleeting advantage that raises the odds of success?
What if China sees a problem that we can't see that backs them into a corner?
What if China thinks that internal problems and the long-range correlation of forces is running against them? What if invading Taiwan soon becomes the best shot at regime survival based on their judgment even if we judge the odds of success low?
Even winning a war with China will be expensive in lives and money. So I'd rather try something other than defeating China in war or deterring China from attacking. I'd like China looking inland for glory and regime survival:
Sure, if we must fight I'd rather win, but just going to war is going to cost us in lives and money.
One can say that we hope that by becoming strong enough we deter the Chinese but this is still only second best. A deterred China will always be on the verge of attacking, just waiting for the moment when we cannot stop them for one reason or another and so cannot deter them for even a short window of opportunity.
No, defeating China makes the best of the worst case and deterring China makes the best of the second worst case. We need to shovel the Snow back north. We need to play the Great Game in Asia to achieve our best case--a China pointed away from the south--Taiwan and the United States and our other allies--and pointed toward the north and the interior of Asia.
How sure are you that outside analysts can read Chinese leadership intentions with high degrees of certainty?
