This author starts out opposing any measure that formalizes American defense commitments to Taiwan and concludes:
However you look at it, extending security guarantees to Taiwan is not in America’s interests.
He's probably right about that narrow question. Formal security guarantees could tempt Taiwan to slight their own defenses and make the Taiwanese more defiant of China, securely protected by America. We don't want that.
If America did formally defend Taiwan, America would need a robust American ground and air presence on Taiwan with more naval and air power in INDOPACOM in general.
But have no doubt that defending Taiwan is in America's interest:
One problem with addressing the Taiwan situation is that too many people think that it is a charity case to support Taiwan and if China gets too tough we can abandon Taiwan and make nice with China. The problem is, the more powerful China gets, the more important it is to have Taiwan as an asset in that potential conflict scenario[.] ...
Clearly, even if we cared not one whit for Taiwanese democracy and independence, blocking Chinese efforts to dominate the seas around them requires a friendly Taiwan as a figurative cork in the bottle penning China's fleet close to shore.
Nor should one assume as the author does that huge China could absorb any casualties to take Taiwan, making our efforts futile:
[If] it ever came to a ground war, they have more than 375 million military-aged males from which to draw for their Army.
China attaches great national importance to “reunifying” Taiwan. It is only 100 miles from its shores (it is more than 7,500 miles from the United States). They would likely be willing to pay an enormous price to claim the island.
One, this isn't the 19th century when peasants could be sent out as cannon fodder. China is not a giant mass of proletarian fury as it was under Mao. China cannot arm and train many of those military-aged males to fight us any more than we could for however many military-age males we have.
And two, even huge China has limits even if the CCP wants to sustain the reputation of past indifference to casualties (quoting a 2005 Proceedings article):
Some months ago it was reported that the Chinese high command regularly provides the leadership with its predictions for an attack against Taiwan. Apparently in 2004 it emerged under questioning that about 21,000 deaths were expected in such an attack. Contrary to Western views that China has unlimited manpower and that human life is cheap, the leadership found this figure unacceptable. It may have feared that casualties on such a scale would have brought its own competence into question. From a Taiwanese point of view, what is interesting (if the report is true) is that Taiwanese forces really do have a deterrent effect on the Chinese Communist leadership.
Ultimately, the best way to protect Taiwan is not to be able to defeat a Chinese invasion attempt but to point China inland and make a Chinese attempt to take Taiwan lower on the imperial to-do list:
Sure, if we must fight I'd rather win, but just going to war is going to cost us in lives and money.
One can say that we hope that by becoming strong enough we deter the Chinese but this is still only second best. A deterred China will always be on the verge of attacking, just waiting for the moment when we cannot stop them for one reason or another and so cannot deter them for even a short window of opportunity.
No, defeating China makes the best of the worst case and deterring China makes the best of the second worst case. We need to shovel the Snow back north. We need to play the Great Game in Asia to achieve our best case--a China pointed away from the south--Taiwan and the United States and our other allies--and pointed toward the north and the interior of Asia.
Have no doubt that China plans to crush Taiwan's democracy and will invade if it needs to. We need to give China higher priority problems.
