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Wednesday, April 08, 2020

The Horse Must Be in Front of the Cart

I sympathize with the objective of having the Lebanese military resist Hezbollah, but without Israel can the Lebanese army take on even a Hezbollah that bled heavily in Syria for Assad?

Nice work if you can get it:

As Lebanon struggles with an economic crisis and the new coronavirus pandemic, momentum is building in Washington to curtail or end U.S. assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Such a move could diminish U.S. influence and empower Russia and Iran. But the LAF is not helping its advocates to make their case. The Lebanese military must address Hezbollah’s growing arsenal if the LAF is to retain U.S. support.

The United States has fostered close ties with the LAF for years “as the sole legitimate defender of Lebanon’s sovereignty.” Pentagon leaders laud it as a capable partner. Since 2010, the United States has provided more than $1.8 billion in security assistance to the LAF. Among other things, the United States demands that the LAF counter the Iran-backed terrorist group Hezbollah — an entity with the blood of Americans on its hands and a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to U.S. law.

I have long wanted the Lebanese army to reassert control over territory in southern Lebanon that Hezbollah runs as its own proto-state. But I don't think the LAF is capable of defeating Hezbollah--even if the formal splintered government could order such an operation or was willing to risk a major internal war to achieve that. And they are not. No more than the UN force in southern Lebanon can reign in Hezbollah.

I think that Israel would first have to tear up Hezbollah with a large-scale and months-long ground raid:

I've written that I think the Israelis learned their lesson after screwing the pooch in their 2006 war that tried to rely on air power to stop Hezbollah and punish Lebanon into controlling Hezbollah. The next war, I think, will involve a large Israeli ground offensive that pushes all the way to Baalbek in what will be a large raid to really tear up Hezbollah infrastructure and kill as many of Hezbollah's army as they can before pulling out.

Since Iran sent Hezbollah to war in Syria on Assad's behalf, I figured the best timing for the Israeli strike would be when the war is winding down so that Hezbollah has experienced maximum damage there but before it can return to Lebanon and recover from the war.

Also, I've noted while discussing this possibility that Lebanon would have the opportunity to fill the vacuum after Israel withdraws. If the Saudis pull good chunks of the Arab world to back the Israelis in this anti-Iran operation--and Israel focuses on Hezbollah alone--Hezbollah might be destroyed as an Iranian proxy force.

So punishing the LAF for failing to start something they would fail to accomplish seems quite wrong.

But maybe it is a waste of American money to support the LAF if Israel is not going to pave the way for the LAF to reassert Lebanese control in the south.

I've long expected that but I've long been wrong. Who knows? Maybe Israel's political impasse is the factor holding off such an assault.

UPDATE: By chance while working on something completely different I ran across this 2008 paper from the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center on the 2006 war. I won't have a chance to read it for a while but I'll put it here for any interest on the background.