The Syria Prize?

So what is the balance sheet of Russia's intervention in Syria? Stratfor looks at it.

Stratfor says Russia's Syria intervention has and will provide "significant diplomatic, commercial and military rewards" to Russia. The rewards were achieved with a low level of troop commitment, too.

But they say that there is a risk of increasing and lengthy (and costly) violence, including being stuck between Turks and Syrians.

Let's look at the rewards and some potential problems noted by Stratfor (in italics, with my judgment following).

Russia has naval and air bases in Syria. This is true. Assad was willing to let Russia expand their limited facilities there. But what is the point? Russia's navy is in bad shape and is a poor investment given Russia's long land border. Money spent on a Syria presence is money not spent to defend European Russia from a mythical NATO threat and a growing (but denied) Chinese threat in Asia. And anything based in Syria will lead a short but exciting life if war with NATO occurs.

Gave Russia access to commercial opportunities in Syria. Syria is an economic wasteland and those so-called opportunities look more like being responsible for rebuilding Syria.

Increased the reputation of its military. I'll grant them this. Barely. On the downside is the embarrassment of their carrier deployment to Syria and their lack of precision weapons even for their small commitment of troops.

And gave it greater influence in the region and world, including:

--The intervention made for closer relations with Iran and Turkey. True enough. But their differing objectives inside Syria will be all the more intense for their presence in the same country. Support for Assad's survival is not going to paper over their long histories of conflict forever as issues post-Assad's survival come up.

--Compelled the United States to agree to the Syria chemical weapons deal despite concerns over Crimea. I don't know what to say about this time-bending advantage given that the chemical weapons deal was in 2013 (and did I call that accurately, or what?) and the Russian invasion of Ukraine was in 2014. Let's just say impressive if true.

--And forced regional states to worry about and talk to Russia. If that is important to Russia, they got it. Oddly, it does seem important to them.

Russia tested weapons. That's true.

Russia rotated officers through Syria to gain experience. The first part is true but it remains to be seen whether this provided true experience or was mere ticket-punching.

Tested command and control. True. But it was a small intervention in a low-intensity fight. So was it a real test?

Tested the use of mercenary forces. True. Although one part of the test was losing several hundred dead when they attempted to attack an American outpost in the east. And the use of mercenaries exposes Russia's aversion to casualties contrary to their reputation of shrugging off losses as they did on a massive scale in World War II.

And perhaps provided a model of intervention. Wait. What? I thought Crimea and Donbas in Ukraine were already the brilliant model of so-called "hybrid warfare?" I hope Russia doesn't again face opponents who--as Kerry famously explained was our objective--rather than trying to defeat Assad simply wanted to pressure Assad into talking. Imagine the pressure Assad felt knowing that regardless his job was secure. Consider, too, that America defeated the most potent threat to Assad--the Islamic State (ISIL). That's the model Russia hopes to repeat? Fascinating.

Helped get the withdrawal of some American forces. But once ISIL was defeated our eventual exit is guaranteed given that we never tried to defeat Assad. Russian intervention was irrelevant to that reality.

Saw the worsening of American-Turkish relations. Relations certainly worsened since Russian intervention in Syria. But that had nothing to do with Russia's intervention. Erdogan is the reason for worsening relations and long predates the Syrian civil war and then multi-war.

But fighting could intensify and require more Russian efforts to stabilize. True. Especially given the expansion of Russia's deployment to stand between the Kurds and Turkey in the northeast. Enjoy.

Turkey might go nuclear. That is certainly a drawback from Russia's point of view that is a natural development that flows from a breakdown in US-Turkish relations, when the US provides a nuclear umbrella over Turkey as long as Turkey is an ally.

Russia is now stuck between Syria and Turkey and between Israel and Iran. Quite true. Enjoy.

Bottom line, this has been a low-cost success for Russia but has risks in the future. True enough if narrowly defined as keeping Assad in power. Which is great for attracting the loyalty of thug rulers who will draw comfort from the Russian willingness to help the thug ruler slaughter as many people as necessary to remain in power. Yet that Russian reputation may not be that great for Russia in the wider world. eh?

The Russians bought a pile of trouble to get bases in the Mediterranean Sea region. I don't understand the point of Russia expending effort to get a foothold in Syria. I don't think that it does them any good other than to remind them of their Soviet glory days. And I really don't see the point of Russia's escalating role in eastern Syria.

Russia got a sugar rush from their Syria intervention that will wear off as the grind of dealing with that Hell Hole continues to suck resources from Russia. Putin will need another short and glorious war to restore the rush. And one day the short and glorious war will turn out very obviously badly for Russia.