I don't think we could have simply shrugged off 9/11 and let jihadis score a win and perhaps engineer an Arab Winter of jihadi gains across the Arab world disillusioned with their poverty and autocracy and excited by the prospects of the suddenly "strong horse" Islamists providing solutions to their problems.
So yeah, we allocated less effort against China in particular over the last two decades. But as long as we expend the effort to keep the Iraqi and Afghan forces that currently fight the jihadis with our help in the fight, we can afford to refocus on great power competition.
Sure, we could be preparing for conventional war when we will still need to fight insurgents and terrorists. I concur with the idea raised that good soldiers provide the flexibility for any mission. So I think we can do both.
But even if we can't do both, I think we need to prepare for the war we can least afford to lose. We can adapt with good soldiers to lesser threats that can't dramatically harm us even if we start to lose.
As the author summarizes, reflecting my view above:
The military, it seems, has a weird situation on its hands. It is obviously intent on shifting its focus to great-power competition with China and Russia, as it should. Much more is at stake in a war with either country, and while losing to a Middle Eastern insurgency would be bad, losing to China or Russia would be much, much worse.
Also, we should not assume that absent a war against jihadis since 9/11 that the American people--or our allies--would have supported a real focus on confronting increasingly hostile China and Russia in this century.
Work the problem. Don't assume a perfect policy in the past would have spared us the fight against jihadis or prevented the gains China and Russia have made.
It is a good article. I'm not so much criticizing it as using it as a jumping off point. Do read it all.
Strategery is hard. As is predicting the future.
