Oh please:
Information-age unconventional warfare may become the only kinetic option against an adversary with mature anti-access and area-denial capabilities who at present affects ‘conventional deterrence’. To provide military options for government, the army will need to look beyond the ‘forces assigned’ (those we control) to ‘forces available’ (those we can influence).
The power in these information-age concepts has been evidenced by the Kremlin’s ability to win the Crimea and Beijing’s ability to seize the South China Sea; both are examples of ‘manoeuvre warfare’ that led to a ‘rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope’. The conduct of special warfare—operations by, with and through likeminded partners—will increasingly become the norm in this multipolar, constrained security environment.
If proxy wars are the new wave in place of direct conventional war, those examples aren't models for that. And one isn't even an example of a war.
As if America abandoned conventional combat and resorted to proxy war in 1945 in the face of intense Japanese anti-access and area-denial capabilities starting at Okinawa.
But back to the examples of the glorious new age of "information-age unconventional warfare."
Russia won the Crimea campaign because of unique circumstances, and there was little proxy involved given the obvious composition of the "little green men" as Russian special forces Astroturfing rebels on the ground; and given the very open Russian movement into Crimea through the Kerch Strait and via airlifts into Russia's Crimean base complex.This was done in the face of a paralyzed army (suffering from deliberate long-term neglect under pro-Russian rulers) of mostly rear echelon troops during the confused aftermath of a pro-Western revolution.
And I don't want to raise the obvious, but Ukraine didn't have any anti-access/area denial capabilities--see the strait crossing and airlift--to compel Russia to use "information-age unconventional warfare."
As for the South China issue, it isn't even warfare. And it wasn't proxy. China built islands on mere sea features. And claim is different than control.
Maybe conventional war really may become obsolete. Perhaps we are at the point in history where everything before us was different and is now impossible in our unique era. But this article didn't make the case if Crimea and the South China Sea are the prime exhibits.
But hey, at least the author didn't talk about "hybrid" warfare as some magical development. You know what I think about that by now, eh?
