The Kurds of Syria are sitting out the Syria Rebellion:
Back in January the Kurds declared an autonomous provincial government in the northeast. With the help of the autonomous Kurdish government of northern Iraq and the many Kurds in Turkey, the Syrian Kurds are keeping most of the war out of their territory. The Syrian Army considers the Kurds more trouble than they are worth at the moment and something that can be tended to once the other rebels are crushed. Many rebel groups get along with the Kurds and respect their desire to concentrate on protecting their own. Since the northeast is geographically out of the way the Kurds can do that. The Kurds do allow free passage for rebel groups they trust. The Kurds are 15 percent of the Syrian population, moderate and democratic Moslems, concentrated in the northeast. They have long opposed the Assads and are hated by the largely Iraqi ISIL (which has always hated the Iraqi Kurds, especially for their role in the overthrow of Sunni champion Saddam Hussein). Allied with the Kurds are the Christians who are about ten percent of the population. Together the two groups have over 12,000 armed men available (mainly for self-defense).
The Kurdish ability to sit out the Syria Rebellion rests solely on the fact that the jihadis and Assad are too busy to deal with the Kurds.
It's good that we opened up a southern front by beginning to arm and train rebels that aren't tainted by being close to jihadis. But I still think we need to deal with Assad's outposts still holding out in the east away from Core Syria that Assad is fighting for. I noted this back in the fall:
If there was a rebel high command and I was in charge, I'd try to reduce the eastern outposts as a priority.
Assad's major advantage is that he has a mobile force that can be switched between fronts while the rebels are largely strategically immobile. The vast majority of rebels are tied to defending their own home areas--as the Kurds are now. The rebels need their own mobile force:
In addition to building up a southern front of reliably non-jihadi rebels who could march on Damascus if there is a regime collapse, or which might eventually be strong enough to fight its way in, we should try to build up mobile rebel brigades that could wipe out those pockets of Assad forces in the east. Lack of rebels who can be moved around the country to reinforce success, counter regime offensives, or exploit regime weaknesses is a major impediment to pushing Assad over.
The rebels are enduring the Assad offensives, post Kerry-Lavrov chemical deal, but the rebels could use some territorial gains that more clearly show rebel momentum.
The rebels need tangible victories to invigorate their resolve to win and counter the dread of facing Assad's killers who will wipe out villages to win and the reality that Assad will try to starve out anybody who isn't his supporter. Those outposts are hanging out there waiting to be propaganda stories that can erase the advantage that Assad's grinding brutality provides him in demoralizing opposition.
The Kurds can provide that mobile force. If we can get the Kurds to organize a force of several thousand light infantry with heavy weapons support to move around the east and spearhead local rebels in assaults on those Assad outposts, the Kurds could gain victories and possibly interrupt both supply lines for Assad across Iraq and interfere with al Qaeda's ability to go back and forth across the Syria-Iraq border.
The Kurds could make deals with Sunnis in the east to come to their aid to defeat Assad's forces and jihadis out there. And deals with the main rebel factions to grant the Kurds some real autonomy within Syria when the war is over. And deal with the Turks, too, pledging not to seek union with the Iraqi Kurds.
The Kurds would also gain combat experience with this role to be able to defend their right to be left alone if gratitude isn't enough once the war, one day, is over.
The Kurds in Iraq were some of the most effective and reliable government forces that the Shia-dominated Iraqi government fielded. So far, Iraqi Kurdish military strength and that role have enabled the Kurds of Iraq to be left alone from both Saddam's Sunni Arab government after 1991 and from the new Iraqi government after 2003 dominated by the Shia majority.
Heck, the Iraqi Kurds would no doubt help their Syrian brethren in organizing and training such a force.
The Iraqi rebels need a mobile force to eliminate pockets of Assad's forces in the east. The Kurds are the best bet to create this mobile force.
